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ABSTRACT 
 
Credit unions are traditionally small, community-embedded and co-operatively-owned financial 
services organizations that developed to correct various market failures.  Recent changes to 
regulatory policy in the financial services industry in Canada, coupled with advances in 
technology and urbanization of the population, have led to numerous mergers and consolidations 
among credit unions, particularly in Western Canada.  This has the potential to undermine some 
of the historic benefits of CUs when compared to other financial services organizations, as it may 
require credit unions to begin to operate more like banks.  
My thesis provides a detailed examination of how senior leaders in one large Western Canadian 
credit union are handling these issues, and explores what the broader implications might be for 
policy and governance of credit unions in Canada.  Using data collected through semi-structured 
interviews with top management and board members, this study provides insight into senior 
leaders’ perceptions of and responses to competing institutional logics in a credit union. 
Implications for policy, as well as decision-making surrounding co-operative governance, 
strategy, and structure will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Credit unions (CUs) hold a significant place in the Canadian financial services industry (Liew 
and Grant 2015), and play an important role in many communities and well-functioning capitalist 
systems (Schneiberg 2013).  CUs were traditionally small, community-embedded and co-
operatively-owned financial services organizations that developed to correct various market 
failures. In western Canada CUs developed and survived in communities where returns were not 
high enough for banks to invest or where bank cycles and charges were not conducive to local 
development (Purden 1980). They provided financial services to individuals who were credit-
worthy, but could not get loans from the bank, solving problems of adverse selection (e.g., 
Akerlof 1970). More recently, CUs had demonstrated greater financial stability than other types 
of financial service organizations during the 2008 economic crisis, largely due to their ownership 
/ governance structure and methods of capitalization (McKillop and Wilson 2015; Brizland 2013; 
Birchall and Hammond Ketilson 2009). 
CUs provide other benefits as well. Because they are locally-owned and controlled, they are 
more likely than investor-owned firms to invest profits back into the community through 
community economic development (Fairbairn et al. 1997).  For example, communities with local 
CUs benefit from their innovative lending practices, business creation initiatives, community 
involvement, sponsorship of education events, local and regional partnerships, and philanthropic 
donations to community organizations and clubs (Fairbairn et al. 1997).  
Recent changes to regulatory policy in the financial services industry in Canada, coupled with 
advances in technology and urbanization of the population, have led to numerous mergers and 
consolidations among CUs, particularly in Western Canada. Although today these merged CUs 
are much smaller than Canada’s five largest banks,1 which dominate Canada’s financial services 
industry, CUs have grown to manage billions of dollars in assets and serve hundreds of 
thousands of members (Brizland 2014). Furthermore, their “communities” now span much larger 
geographic areas (Brizland 2014). This has the potential to undermine some of the historic 
                                                     
1
 The “Big 5” include: Royal Bank of Canada, Toronto-Dominion Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, 
and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. 
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advantages of CUs when compared to other financial services organizations, and it may require 
CUs to begin to operate more ”bank-like”2 (Liew and Grant 2015, 7). The overall aim of this 
thesis is to conduct a detailed examination of how one credit union that has grown quickly 
through a series of mergers is handling these issues, and explore what the implications might be 
for policy and governance of CUs in Canada. 
1.2  Regulatory Policy in Financial Services and Governance of Credit Unions 
The primary way a CU differs from an investor-owned bank is in its ownership/governance 
structure, which leads to a greater emphasis on multiple – and sometimes conflicting – 
objectives. The owners of a CU are also the members who use its services. As such, the 
maximization of member benefits is their primary motive, rather than profit-maximization 
(Taylor 1971). Decision makers in investor-owned banks are driven by short-term maximization 
of quarterly profits and share prices (Barton 2011). CUs are democratically-controlled, generally 
through elected boards, and decision makers are held accountable to the membership based on 
their ability to meet their membership’s needs and preferences. This arguably leads to a longer-
term focus and more favourable outcomes for members and members’ communities (McKillop 
and Wilson 2015). However, recent changes to regulations specific to the financial service 
industry in Canada, CU growth through mergers, and other governance changes being considered 
and adopted by CU decision makers, may alter the way these organizations operate.   
Recent regulatory changes include: 1) requirements that force financial services organizations to 
track and report on illegal activities such as money laundering and tax fraud which create 
additional fixed costs that are problematic for small CUs; 2) a withdrawal of a small business tax 
deduction that had previously supported CUs; and 3) liquidity requirements that are problematic 
for CUs due to the way they are capitalized. Some of these changes, such as the removal of the 
tax deduction, were introduced in an effort to “level the playing field” between growing CUs and 
banks. However, these changes have not taken into account the unique nature of the co-operative 
model, and can lead to a disproportionate financial burden being placed on CUs when compared 
                                                     
2
 The phrase “bank-like” and the idea of “acting more like banks” are employed in this study based on the usage 
adopted by Liew and Grant (2015) in their article “Positioning Saskatchewan’s Credit Unions for Growth”, and as 
discussed by interviewees in this study. This terminology represents a way of operating that is primarily focused on 
profitability and efficiency concerns. We recognize that there are many banks that also operate with broader 
objectives.  
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to banks (Liew and Grant 2015). At the same time, the financial services industry is becoming 
increasingly competitive due to technological advances and increased urbanization of the 
population, requiring CUs to compete directly for customers with some of the largest financial 
services organizations in the country. 
Mergers and consolidations have become commonplace among CUs in Canada to create 
economies of scale to meet regulatory requirements and/or to improve member service quality 
and lower prices. These mergers between smaller CUs create major implications for governance 
of the newly consolidated organization. A CU’s size and membership diversity increases with 
each merger or acquisition.  Some question the ability of their elected boards to effectively 
manage the risks and strategic requirements of the larger CU (Chen, Spizzirri and Fullbrook 
2010). One recommended practice is for CUs to amend their bylaws to include nominating 
committees that actively recruit individuals within the membership who have the necessary 
competencies, personal attributes, and skills (British Columbia Credit Union Task Force on 
Governance 2012). Some proposed changes to bylaws would even allow for the appointment of 
additional, non-elected directors with the desired competencies if the election process does not 
result in a board with the right knowledge, experience, and skills (Central 1 2014).  
1.3 Empirical Problem 
…it will be a challenge to continue to be profitable enough to be strong, so that (the 
CFO) can sleep at night, and then to be relevant to the members and still give back, and 
still be true to our grass roots, and that's giving back to communities. (Credit Union 
Executive) 
The quote represents the struggles increasingly experienced by CU decision makers as they 
guide their organizations through these challenges in a rapidly changing environment. In addition 
to the aforementioned regulatory and policy changes, financial products and services are 
becoming more mobile through advances in technology, and CU customers are increasingly 
moving to or living in urban areas. CUs must offer members rates that are competitive with other 
financial services organizations. Ultimately, strengthening a CU’s bottom line will enhance its 
ability to offer members better financial products and services and at competitive rates. 
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However, CUs are also co-operatives – organizations that are owned jointly and democratically 
directed by members to meet common economic, social, and/or cultural needs (Co-operative 
Learning Centre 2012). As co-operatives, the core principles and governance structures of CUs 
guide them to be member driven and community focused. Although generating consistent 
financial returns is essential to ongoing success, membership demands can be diverse. In 
addition to providing for the financial needs of members, CUs will often serve other social needs 
of the membership through donations to various community programs and initiatives, or by being 
the only financial service provider in the community.  
Meeting these multiple objectives in this industry is challenging. CUs face direct and increasing 
competition from both investor-owned banks (e.g., RBC, CIBC, TD Canada Trust, etc.) and 
federal crown corporations (e.g., Farm Credit Canada). They also face increasing competition 
from other growing CUs. Investor-owned banks have been highly successful in providing 
excellent financial products and services to customers at very good prices, often at better rates 
than CUs are able to offer due to greater economies of scale. And while government-owned 
crown corporations operate under a completely different legislative and regulatory framework, 
CUs are increasingly becoming subject to similar regulations as the banks. Thus, CU decision 
makers face constant internal and external pressure to adapt their governance structures and 
decision-making processes, and to adopt similar business strategies as the banks relating to 
efficiency and growth. Mergers and consolidations are a common CU response to these 
pressures, creating economies of scale that would otherwise not be obtainable for a traditional 
local and community-embedded CU.   
There are some advantages to increasing a CU’s focus on efficiency and growth; CU members 
can greatly benefit from improved rates and services. However, there are potential situations 
where adopting certain strategies would produce outcomes that are counter to some member 
needs and preferences, or to the broader social objectives of the CU. For example, closing a 
struggling branch might strengthen the CU financially, thereby enhancing the efficiency, 
competitiveness, and product offerings in the organization as a whole. However, such actions are 
also likely to create difficulties for CU employees and members from that community. 
Growth could also threaten some of a CU’s inherent advantages in addressing market and policy 
failures, as well as community needs. For example, CUs have traditionally incurred less risk in 
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lending and solved problems of adverse selection directly as a result of the relationship linkage 
between member-owners and through the first-hand knowledge about both the members and the 
local economic situation that CU managers would have from being embedded in the community 
(Klinedinst 2010). Larger CUs with many branches may be less connected to each community. 
The member-owner link may be diminished when an individual member’s vote is one in 
thousands rather than one in hundreds, reducing responsiveness to individual member and 
community needs.  
Recent regulatory and policy changes in the industry have put pressure on CUs to become even 
more bank-like (Liew and Grant 2015). Regulatory changes have increased fixed costs facing 
CUs due to security reporting requirements, and introduced new funding and liquidity 
constraints, while limiting the ability of CUs to raise the necessary revenue through their primary 
means of capitalization (i.e., through member deposits and equity). Moreover, many 
governments have removed CU-friendly tax policy in an effort to ‘level the playing field’. The 
logical response to these changes would be to pursue more aggressive growth (both organic 
and/or through mergers/acquisitions) to minimize the relative impact of the increased fixed costs 
and leverage economies of scale, and many Western Canadian CUs have adopted this strategy 
(Bauer et al. 2009). As mentioned, CU decision makers may also feel compelled to search for 
internal efficiencies such as branch closures or reduction in staffing levels to reduce costs.   
There may be good reasons for large (and growing) CUs to consider changing their board 
election rules away from the democratic member assembly election tradition. The industry is 
becoming more complex and dynamic, requiring board members to have highly developed 
knowledge, skills and abilities. The growth experienced by these organizations and the 
increasing reliance on mobile banking has resulted in a much larger membership that can span 
vastly different geographic and socioeconomic populations. This has increased the heterogeneity 
of the membership, which has been one reason proposed for the demutualization of CUs in the 
United States (Schneiberg 2014). The general election format risks selection of a board that lacks 
the essential competencies or diversity needed to successfully direct these CUs. Changes to 
governance structures and practices may increase a co-operative board’s collective knowledge in 
vital areas which can increase the board’s expertise.  
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There is a possibility; however, that certain changes to governance could also detrimentally 
impact a board of directors’ connection with the needs of the members and perceptions of its 
legitimacy. For instance, Mountain Equipment Co-op – a non-financial co-operative – has been 
criticized for introducing restrictions to election bylaws that have resulted in member concerns 
that it is closer to operating like a corporation than a co-operative (Silcoff and Strauss 2015).    
There are concerns that the recent industry and regulatory changes may be causing CUs to act 
like banks (Liew and Grant 2015).  It is important that CUs remain distinctly different from 
banks.  The recent economic crisis revealed their ability to withstand economic pressures 
differently and in many cases better than banks (McKillop and Wilson 2015).  Moreover, well-
functioning CUs economically empower local communities (Fairbairn et al 1997; McKillop and 
Wilson 2015).  If Canadian CUs lose their distinctiveness, Canadians will lose this important 
financial services alternative.   
Given the recent industry and regulatory changes, and the internal changes to governance of CUs 
due to increasing mergers in response to these changes, my particular interest in undertaking this 
case study is to understand how CU decision makers perceive and respond to the pressures in 
their organizations. Are CU decision-makers beginning to think and act more like banks? Do the 
changes in regulatory policy and/or governance structure serve to constrain or enable CU 
responses? What impact might a change in governance structure have on the actions the CU will 
undertake? This thesis will explore these issues in a qualitative interview-based case study of one 
credit union that is growing quickly through mergers. The research will have practical 
implications for CUs attempting to navigate these pressures, as well as policy makers 
considering policy and regulatory changes that do not recognize the inherent tensions and 
multiple objectives in CUs.   
1.4 Theoretical Contribution 
Recent theory and research in new institutional theory on hybrid organizations and institutional 
logics offers insight into how CU decision makers might experience and respond to the 
competing pressures to both increase efficiency while meeting members’ objectives and 
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supporting the local community. CUs can be considered ‘hybrid’ organizations.3 Hybrid 
organizations embody multiple world views, also known as institutional logics (Pache and 
Santos 2010). Institutional logics (ILs) are taken-for-granted beliefs, assumptions and practices 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991) that guide individual actions in organizations.   
At any given time or location multiple ILs are available for use within organizations. Sometimes 
different objectives or backgrounds will result in two or more institutional logics existing at the 
same time within an organization (Thornton and Ocasio 1999), resulting in significant 
complexity (Greenwood et al. 2011). Within these hybrid organizations each IL can be 
represented to varying degrees and can oscillate over time with dominance shifting between 
logics (Dunn and Jones 2010). Often the presence of two or more logics will result in conflicting 
pressures on organizational decision-makers since the adoption of practices that support one 
could directly oppose those supporting the other (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978).   
CUs are examples of hybrid organizations, and the “pressures” faced by CU decision-makers can 
be seen as manifestations of competing institutional logics. As financial services organizations, 
CUs need to achieve organizational success as measured through market positioning and various 
financial ratios.  The perceptions and practices experienced in this industry constitute a financial 
logic. In the same way, individuals working in community-focused organizations adhere to 
principles promoting a commitment to community values, including investment in local 
communities.  These are consistent with a community logic.  There are pressures from the 
industry and the community to operate in ways that are consistent with these logics.  
 A CU’s decision-makers are likely to experience conflict in areas where different institutional 
logics prescribe opposing actions. For example, a CU decision maker’s focus on ensuring greater 
organizational efficiency might prompt them to considering closing non-profitable branches 
                                                     
3
 The use of the term “hybrid organization” in institutional theory differs from hybrid organizational 
arrangements, which involves the combination of two different organizations to pursue a common interest 
(see Borys and Jemison 1989).  The term “hybrid” is also used in describing organizations such as social 
enterprises that obtain resources from a combination of market and other forms of economic exchange 
(Nyssens 2006).  Co-operatives have elsewhere been labeled “hybrid organizations” by Claude Ménard 
(2004), but this conceptualization also differs from how hybrid organizations are discussed in reference to 
ILs.  
 
11 
 
(financial logic); however, sustaining an unprofitable branch will ensure local members’ lives are 
not disrupted and could aid in supporting local employment and development (community logic). 
Decision-makers in hybrid organizations have been shown to respond to these pressures in 
different ways, depending on the degree to which others within their organization identify with 
each institutional logic, and the comparative strength of each logic (Pache and Santos 2013; 
Besharov 2014; Kodeih and Greenwood 2014). Other factors also impact the pressures that CU 
decision makers face and how they respond. For example, organizational structures can be used 
to compartmentalize opposing logics thereby isolating decision-makers from identity struggles 
and conflict (Kraatz and Block 2008) or to support confrontation between logics resulting in 
innovation (Jay 2013). HR practices have also been shown to impact the balance of logics in the 
field of microfinance. The use of deliberate hiring and socialization practices helped sustain a 
balance of commercial and developmental logics (Battilana and Dorado 2010), and ongoing 
negotiation practices supported a balance of conflicting logics which sustained a productive 
tension that resulted in more success than in branches that supported only one logic (Canales 
2013).   
Organizational governance arrangements may also play an important role in this area (Kraatz and 
Block 2008; Battilana and Lee 2014; Jarzabkowski et al 2009; Pache 2011). However, there has 
been very little theoretical and empirical research on how governance structures impact decision-
making in hybrids, and virtually no research has been done on co-operatives as a form of hybrid 
organization in this literature. The literature on co-operative governance is also gaining 
increasing attention (Fulton & Pohler 2015). Given the unique nature of a co-operative’s 
governance structure when compared to other hybrids that have been examined, this thesis aims 
to provide important theoretical insights that contribute to an improved understanding of how 
governance structures affect decision-making in hybrid organizations. My case study of one 
credit union that has undergone a series of mergers allows me to explore the implications of 
internal changes to governance in a hybrid organization, and how these changes influence the 
perceptions and responses of senior decision-makers to the pressures they are facing.  
1.5 Purpose of Thesis 
This thesis is intended to increase understanding around how Canadian CU decision makers 
perceive and respond to changes in regulatory policy, the competitive landscape, and internal 
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governance practices that could fundamentally impact the way they operate. Through learning 
about how CU leaders experience and respond to pressures associated with these changes, policy 
makers will be better able to predict the effects of such legislation on financial co-operatives and 
create policies that will support a healthy and competitive financial services industry. 
Theoretically, although new institutional research on the balance of competing tensions in hybrid 
organizations is growing rapidly, there has been little empirical research into how an 
organization’s governance structure impacts the balance of institutional logics within the 
organization. CUs are a form of hybrid organization that exists in the intersection of both the 
financial and community logics. Due to their co-operative governance structure, CU decision 
makers not only experience both logics, but must also find an appropriate balance between both 
of them in order to successfully direct their organizations. This research will also offer 
theoretical insights into the role of governance in the balancing of institutional logics in hybrid 
organizations, specifically financial service co-operatives. 
1.6 Organization of Thesis 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter 2 provides the contextual background of the 
Canadian financial services industry. It also highlights the role of CUs within that industry, and 
provides further detail into some of the major regulatory and governance changes that CU 
decision-makers have been recently facing. Chapter 3 reviews the relevant theory and research 
on new institutional theory and governance. Chapter 4 presents the methodology, and Chapter 5 
the analysis and results. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by returning to a broader 
discussion of the policy implications of the findings, as well as highlighting the practical 
relevance of the findings for CU decision-makers. 
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CHAPTER 2: CREDIT UNIONS AND THE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
INDUSTRY 
2.1  Chapter Overview   
This chapter provides the contextual background for the thesis. It begins with an overview of the 
Canadian financial services industry and highlights the role of credit unions (CUs) within that 
industry. It follows with further detail into some of the major regulatory and governance changes 
that CU decision-makers have been recently facing, and the pressures that this creates inside a 
CU. 
2.2  The Canadian Financial Services Industry   
Canada’s financial industry is comprised of investor-owned (chartered) banks, government-
owned crown corporations, and member-owned credit unions (which include the caisses 
populaires in Quebec).  Each of these types of organizations differs in governance structure, 
regulatory jurisdiction, and service offerings.  
2.2.1 Chartered Banks 
Chartered banks are the largest financial service providers in Canada.  Their services are vast and 
competitively priced, making them the financial service provider of choice for the majority of 
Canadians.  Canada’s chartered banks are generally classified based on whether or not they are 
one of Canada’s “Big Five” (bankingcanada.net 2015).  “Big Five” is the term used for Canada’s 
five biggest banks which include: the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Toronto-Dominion 
Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, Bank of Nova Scotia, and the Bank of Montreal (Wikipedia, 
2015).  The second tier of banks are smaller, but still form a core group in the Canadian banking 
industry. These include: AMEX Bank of Canada, Citibank Canada, and HSBC Canada 
(bankingcanada.net 2015). 
Canada’s chartered banks are classified as Schedule I (domestic banks), Schedule II (subsidiaries 
of foreign banks) or Schedule III (foreign banks) (Canadian Bankers Association 2015). They are 
federally regulated under Canada’s Bank Act with each classification of bank being held to 
different levels of restrictions and statuses.  The Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions (OSFI) regulates chartered banks and other federally incorporated or registered 
financial companies such as trusts, insurance companies, and private pension plans (Office of the 
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Superintendent of Financial Institutions 2015).  Eligible deposits within charter banks are insured 
through the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation 
2015).   
2.2.2 Financial Crown Corporations 
Government-owned financial institutions such as the Business Development Bank of Canada, 
Export Development Corporation, the Canadian Commercial Corporation, and Farm Credit 
Canada exist to help grow and support the economy through providing assistance and resources 
in specified areas that are intended to complement others in their field.  They are run by 
government-appointed boards who oversee the strategic direction of the organization (Stastna 
2012).  Federal government-owned financial institutions adhere to guidelines and regulations 
concerning the governance of Crown corporations that are set out by the Treasury Board 
Secretariat of the Government of Canada, and they report to parliament through their respective 
Ministry.  For example, the Export Development Corporation reports through the Minister of 
International Trade (Export Development Canada 2015) and the Business Development Bank of 
Canada reports through the Minister of Industry (Business Development Bank of Canada 2014).  
Crown corporations annually undergo an audit and most crown corporations will annually submit 
corporate plans, and budgets which are tabled in Parliament (Stastna 2012). 
As a result of their specialized mandates, government-owned financial institutions’ service 
offerings can differ in many ways from chartered banks and CUs and will often be 
complementary to services offered in the private sector.  For example, the Business Development 
Bank of Canada (BDC) provides funding and services aimed at entrepreneurs’ needs that may be 
at higher lending rates, but they also offer specialized services and flexible repayment terms that 
benefit new entrepreneurs (Business Development Bank of Canada 2014). Government-owned 
financial institutions may also compete with private industry. Farm Credit Canada’s (FCC) 
purpose is to, “enhance rural Canada by providing specialized and personalized business and 
financial services and products to farming operations, including family farms, and to those 
businesses in rural Canada, including small and medium-sized businesses, that are businesses 
related to farming” (Farm Credit Canada 2015).  Due to changes in its policy mandate in 1993 
and 2001, Farm Credit Canada (FCC) now competes directly with private sector financial 
institutions and even with the BDC (Martin 2014).   
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2.2.3 Credit Unions and Caisses Populaires 
CUs are run by a board of directors which is traditionally democratically elected from among the 
membership.  The board hires a CEO who, in turn, hires and manages the employee base and 
carries out the board’s strategic direction within the organization.    
In contrast to chartered banks and government-owned financial institutions, CUs have 
historically been provincially regulated (Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
2015).  Each provincial government either regulates their CU industry or has appointed an arm’s 
length regulator to do so.  Separate deposit insurance providers exist in each province; however, 
the extent of their coverage varies provincially and is generally greater than for chartered banks.  
Currently there is no CU legislation covering CUs in Canada’s three territories. 
Table 1 lists the deposit insurance providers and regulators for each Canadian province. 
Table 1 - Provincial CU Insurance Providers and Regulators 
Province Deposit Insurance Provider Regulator 
British 
Columbia 
Credit Union Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 
(CUDIC) 
Financial Institutions Commission of 
British Columbia (FICOM) 
Alberta Credit Union Deposit 
Guarantee Corporation of 
Alberta (CUDGC) 
Alberta Superintendent of Financial 
Insitutions (ASFI) 
Saskatchewan Credit Union Deposit 
Guarantee Corporation of 
Saskatchewan (CUDGC) 
CUDGC, mandated by the Province of 
Saskatchewan 
Manitoba Deposit Guarantee 
Corporation of Manitoba 
(DGCM) 
Financial Institutions Regulation 
Branch (FIRB) 
Ontario Deposit Insurance 
Corporation of Ontario 
(DICO) 
Financial Services Commission of 
Ontario (FSCO)  
Quebec Autorité des marches Autorité des marches financiers du 
16 
 
financiers du Québec (AMF) Québec (AMF) 
New 
Brunswick 
New Brunswick Credit Union 
Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (NBCUDIC) 
Risk Management Agency of New 
Brunswick 
Nova Scotia 
(NS) 
Credit Union Deposit 
Insurance Corporation of 
Nova Scotia (NSCUDIC) 
Financial Institutions Division of the 
NS Department of Finance 
Prince Edward 
Island (PE) 
Prince Edward Island Credit 
Union Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (PEICUDIC) 
Department of Environment, Labour 
and Justice (Financial Services 
section) 
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
Credit Union Guarantee 
Corporation (CUDGC)  
Government Service Branch, 
Financial Services Regulation 
Division 
Source:  Taken from each of the Deposit insurance providers websites 
Francophone CUs in Canada are referred to as Caisses Populaires.  These primarily exist in 
Quebec, and certain communities in Ontario, Manitoba, and New Brunswick.  The large majority 
of Caisses Populaires are part of the Desjardins Group, which holds the largest association of 
CUs in North America.  Much larger than any one Canadian CU, this group primarily operates in 
the provinces of Quebec and parts of Ontario and is active throughout North America and 
developing countries (Goth et al. 2012).  The Desjardins Group operates a range of subsidiary 
organizations that offer financial products and services such as real estate, venture capital funds, 
insurance, and security.  Due to their difference in size, history and the way that they are 
regulated compared to other Canadian CUs, the Desjardins Group of Caisses Populaires are 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
Outside of Quebec, CUs are represented regionally by trade associations called Centrals or 
Federations.  These organizations act as payment processors, advocate for the collective needs of 
provincial CUs, and maintain a liquidity pool that covers cyclic variations.  Centrals are further 
represented nationally by the Credit Union Central of Canada (CUCC).  With supportive input 
from the CUCC, the Canadian federal government amended Canada’s Bank Act to support the 
creation of CUs under federal jurisdiction (Canada Gazette 2012).  CUs have been slow to 
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embrace this option, with only one CU attempting to change jurisdiction in April 2015 (Shecter 
2015). This avoidance may be attributed to stricter regulations and higher scrutiny in the federal 
jurisdiction (Shecter 2015).  
2.3 The Credit Union Difference 
Operating in the same field as banks and financial crowns, CUs offer many of the same services 
to the same people.  Like banks, CUs operate in the private sector, with no direct government 
involvement.  However, similar to Canada’s financial crowns, CUs were initially developed to 
address a market failure, and also tend to be more risk-averse than organizations that focus on 
quarterly earnings (Liew & Grant, 2014).  
Notwithstanding their similarities, CUs are also unique from both banks and financial crowns. 
Differences in governance structures, member preferences, methods of capitalization, and size 
result in different income sources and cost structures. Bank earnings are largely realized from 
non-income sources such as capital market activities and service charges, and Crowns have 
access to low-cost borrowing through the Government of Canada.  In contrast, CUs rely on 
generating much of their earnings from interest income. Each CU’s cost structure also differs, 
based on their membership preferences for services. For instance, many CUs continue to operate 
full-service branches in smaller communities, and support their local communities through 
philanthropic donations (Fairbairn et al. 1997).  
CUs behave differently from banks.  Although customer service is important in banks, banks 
have a history of exiting smaller communities, using international call-centers, and adopting a 
greater online presence, resulting in lower costs in relation to assets than generally exist for CUs 
(Liew and Grant 2015).  One example of this was the recent announcement that the Bank of 
Nova Scotia planned to cut 1,500 jobs in a restructuring effort aimed at focusing the company on 
higher-growth areas (Schecter 2014).   
In recent years CUs have been purchasing branches in western Canada as the banks withdraw 
from smaller rural communities.  For instance, from 1999 to 2004 in Manitoba, the number of 
bank service points decreased by approximately 24 percent, while CUs, already with branches in 
many of these same locations, increased their total number of branches by approximately 10 
percent (Fairbairn 2012). In contrast, CUs are directly linked to their communities and thus 
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support their communities’ economic development (Fairbairn et al. 1997).  CUs benefit from 
vibrant communities and regularly participate in the community in ways that will support the 
community’s growth.  Local money deposited in CUs is re-invested and circulated in the local 
communities through local loans, community support and enhanced member services and rates.  
As one executive from this study stated, while banks are engines of the economy, CUs are 
“engines of the local economy” (Executive B). 
2.4 Regulatory Changes 
The recent financial crisis triggered a deep recession in Canada, due to close economic ties to the 
United States (Barrera 2010).   Changes to American lending standards impacted credit 
availability in the United States which, in turn, impacted credit availability in Canada (Barrera 
2010). 
The financial crisis impacted consumer confidence and investment patterns.  For example, a 
drastic reduction in liquidity in the financial markets forced CFOs of major corporations around 
the world to rethink traditional business investments (Campello et al. 2010), and has changed the 
demand for financial products. In an effort to rebuild confidence in the banking system and 
ensure the events triggering the crisis will not transpire in the future, governments are adopting 
stricter regulations.   
International banking regulations are agreed upon by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, set in policy by the G20’s Financial Stability Board (Financial Stability Board 
2015).  Federally these have been phased in by an independent agency of the government of 
Canada, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) (Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions 2012).  The federal CU regulations, now covered under 
the most recent revision of the Bank Act, will be based on the same capital requirements that are 
being imposed on federally regulated banks and will be supervised directly by OSFI (Office of 
the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 2015).  Provincial CUs, however, have different 
regulations that include aspects of Basel I, Basel II, or Basel III depending on the provincial 
jurisdiction under which they fall (Pigeon 2015).  The new standards place increased pressures 
on each jurisdiction to provide regulations that will maintain confidence, stability and provide a 
level playing field for all financial services organizations. 
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Basel 1 focused on credit risk and the weightings used to assess a financial service organization’s 
ability to hold the required capital to risk-weighted assets.  Over time it was amended to address 
market risk around foreign exchange and other more risky transactions.  Basel II was a revised 
framework comprised of three pillars.  These included minimum capital requirements, 
supervisory review of an institution’s capital adequacy, and the development of an internal 
assessment process and use of greater disclosure requirements to encourage sound banking 
processes (Bank for International Settlements 2014). 
The most recent set of standards are the Basel III and they focus on capital adequacy in 
addressing risk. Capital is necessary in balancing off potential losses during poor business 
conditions. The liquidity of the capital is, therefore, an important factor in assessing risk. The 
Basel committee has adopted requirements ensuring adequate amounts of Tier 1, or the most 
liquid forms of capital.  This requirement can be problematic for CUs, due to their limitations in 
building this type of capital since members shares do not qualify as equity. Beyond Basel 
standards, Canadian deposit-taking institutions are now required to monitor and report on 
activities related to possible criminal activities, tax fraud, terrorism and foreign policy (Liew and 
Grant 2015). These requirements further increase the fixed costs of financial services institutions 
and can become a disadvantage for smaller ones, such as CUs, that are less able to absorb the 
costs (Pigeon 2015). 
As costs and complexity rise, Canadian CUs have also recently experienced a change in their tax 
situation that further impacts their competitiveness.  The 2013 federal budget introduced a 
gradual withdrawal of a preferential tax rate that had been accessible to CUs with incomes 
greater than $500,000. This tax credit was introduced in the 1970s to enable CUs to compete 
with other small Canadian-controlled private corporations. The withdrawal of the credit was 
intended to increase the neutrality in the system since CUs had been receiving the tax credit and 
Canadian banks had not (Liew and Grant 2015).  
Instead of “leveling the playing field”, these regulatory and policy changes actually put CUs at a 
fairly severe competitive disadvantage (Liew and Grant 2015). Canada’s banks are larger and are 
better able to build capital than CUs. They also have access to more favorable tax rates through 
their capital gains. And financial crowns, the other main competitors for CUs, are not obliged to 
follow the same capital constraints. How are CUs able to compete, given these challenges? 
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2.5 Growth Response 
Growth is one way to respond to the consequences of these pressures. Strong growth will 
increase the asset base which enhances financial stability for the CU, and lead to better services 
and prices. Growth also brings about economies of scale which would be expected to increase 
organizational profitability through generating efficiencies.  However, some evidence suggests 
that improved efficiencies brought about by mergers are not superior to those achieved through 
internal growth (Ralston, Wright and Garden 2001). 
While CUs were engaged in ad hoc mergers and consolidations prior to these pressures due to 
changing community demographics and structures, CUs have been increasingly undertaking 
mergers and consolidations in response to the aforementioned regulatory and policy pressures 
(Anderson and Liu 2013), resulting in organizations that bear little resemblance to their earlier 
local, community-embedded forms. The number of CUs has decreased while the size of the 
average CU has grown dramatically. Recent statistics show that from 1993 to 2012, the number 
of Canadian CUs dropped by approximately 34 percent (Brizland 2013). Meanwhile, over the 
same two decades, the average membership in Canadian CUs almost quadrupled from 3,895 to 
15,248 and their average assets increased from $36.1 million to $438.3 million (Brizland 2013). 
The top ten Canadian CCUs account for over 45% of total CCU assets (Brizland 2013). These 
mega-CUs offer strong competition to charter banks and financial crowns within their provincial 
jurisdictions. As of September 29, 2014, Canadian CUs outside of Quebec with the top reported 
assets were as follows: 
Table 2 - Top 10 Canadian Credit Unions 
Ranking Top 10 Canadian Credit Unions (Outside Quebec) 
1 Vancity (British Columbia) 
2 Servus Credit Union (Alberta) 
3 Coast Capital Savings (British Columbia) 
4 Meridian Credit Union (Ontario) 
5 First West Credit Union (British Columbia) 
6 Conexus Credit Union (Saskatchewan) 
7 Steinbach Credit Union (Manitoba) 
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8 Affinity Credit Union (Saskatchewan) 
9 Assiniboine Credit Union (Manitoba) 
10 Cambrian Credit Union (Manitoba) 
from: Largest 100 Credit Unions Retrieved 19/08/2014 from Credit Union 
Central: 
http://www.cucentral.ca/SitePages/Publications/FactsAndFigures.aspx 
 
Although quite large when compared to their CU peers, these large CUs are still quite small in 
comparison with some of their major competitors. Canada’s Big 5 banks, which are also some of 
the strongest banks in the world, together hold assets in the hundreds of billions of dollars 
(Alexander and Pasternack 2012). 
This growth could lessen some distinct advantages that CUs possess. CUs, like many co-
operatives, are historically comprised of individuals linked through a common bond and/or a 
commitment to a common project (Birchall 1997). Since members personally knew the people 
being impacted by their actions, they may have risked reputational damage if they shirked on 
their responsibilities to the community (Klinedinst 2010). The common bond in smaller CUs 
may enhance the loyalty of members and increase their accountability to each other.  Growth has 
the potential to reduce this commitment to a common project because members become 
increasingly heterogeneous, have different reasons for joining the credit union, and may become 
less connected to other members than members who belong to a smaller, community-based CU. 
Increasing membership heterogeneity of mutuals in the USA has been one factor linked to 
demutualization (Schneiberg 2014). Demutualization is the conversion of a co-operative into 
another organizational form through converting equity into shares or through mergers, takeovers 
or buyouts of non-co-operative organizations; this will generally occur when a co-operative has 
been having difficulties (Fulton and Girard 2015). Growth can also impact the member-owner 
connection.  Larger CUs with many branches may become less connected to each community, 
and the member-owner link may be diminished when an individual member’s vote is one in 
thousands rather than one in hundreds, reducing responsiveness to both member and community 
needs.  
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2.6 Governance Response 
The increasing heterogeneity in larger CUs also creates a membership base with more 
complicated and diverse needs. Without the proper knowledge about how the CU should respond 
to these complexities, a CU board of directors risks crucial missteps in decision-making and 
setting a strategic direction. Lack of critical board competencies can decrease the perception that 
they are able to lead the organization, and impede their ability to effectively monitor 
management. As a result, nominating committees are often used to select candidates that meet 
specific competencies, and the membership then elects their board members from that list (Goth 
et al 2012).  It has been further recommended that, instead of the membership electing board 
members, they elect an independent governance committee that selects and appoints the board of 
directors; this committee would act as an extension of the membership, and the appointed board 
would be chosen based on competencies and other factors important to the membership (Goth et 
al 2012). 
Central 1, the trade association governing CUs in British Columbia and Ontario, has recently 
proposed these amendments to their bylaws.  In addition to their skill-based board recruitment 
system, these amendments will allow board members to appoint up to two additional board 
members should the “required skill sets not be available from officers and directors of the 
member credit unions who have been elected, as determined by the Board” (Central 1 2014, 6).  
Appointment of board members may be a logical step in managing the risks of these multi-
million dollar organizations; however, it is also a large step away from the traditional democratic 
and community-based roots of CUs.   
2.7 CU Decision-Maker Response 
To summarize, regulatory changes in the financial services industry have prompted increased 
growth in CUs and direct competition with banks, resulting in greater complexity and associated 
governance challenges. CU decision makers face a situation where previous locally-based 
strategies are becoming unsustainable, or even irrelevant. For example, one advantage that early 
CUs had over the banks was the ability for a manager to loan money based on an individual’s 
reputation (Klinedinst 2010).  The riskiness associated with such a loan was lower since 
managers knew the loan recipients and loan recipients were owner-members of the CU and had 
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an interest in maintaining their reputations. Today’s CUs have grown to the point that strategies 
based on these advantages are no longer as relevant. 
In such circumstances, CU decision makers may be influenced by banks as they search for what 
they perceive to be successful practices within their industry (Bager 1994).  Many CU executives 
in my study gained work experience in banks or other investor-owned corporations, or had 
received their education within business schools that tend to be dominated by training in 
traditional investor-owned governance structures and business models.  This experience could 
result in a CU responding with strategies that would be appropriate in an investor-owned bank, 
such as placing greater emphasis on profit maximization, expanding market share through 
aggressive growth, mergers and acquisitions, and/or finding and exploiting efficiencies and 
economies of scale through closing unprofitable branches and/or laying off employees.   
This philosophy and approach differs from traditional CU practices. Western Canadian CUs have 
developed strong ties to their communities and adhere to their democratic values of equality and 
equity amongst members. Many CUs pride themselves on how they treat employees, as 
employees are also often members of the CU. Rather than existing solely to build shareholder 
value, CUs aspire to deliver high quality and low-priced financial services to their members, and 
to build members’ communities. Indeed, CUs are often the last business standing in many rural 
Western Canadian communities. For instance, as banks were reducing services and withdrawing 
from rural Manitoba communities, CUs were purchasing the branches from the banks and 
investing into infrastructure in those communities (Fairbairn 2012).     
These two ways of thinking can often be complementary. For instance, finding efficiencies will 
ensure greater membership benefits through providing low interest rates on loans, which 
encourages local investment. Creating economies of scale can allow a CU to re-allocate savings 
to increase the number of financial services offered to members, or to offer member patronage 
refunds. This can ultimately contribute to building and improving members’ quality of life in 
their communities.  
However, there will be times when the two goals may conflict; when the community-focused co-
operative response and core values may run counter to efficiency norms. For example, CU 
decision makers may struggle over the decision to close an unprofitable branch. Indeed, a bank 
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would not hesitate to close an unprofitable branch rather than accept it as an ongoing liability. As 
mentioned, the adoption of this logic in banks within the financial services industry has been 
evidenced by the rapid closure of bank branches in many smaller communities in western 
Canada (Halsath and Ryser 2006; Fairbairn 2012).   
CUs do not have quarterly obligations to maximize profits and increase shareholder value; 
however, they still exist to offer the services that their members need, and at competitive prices. 
As CUs get larger through mergers, unprofitable branches could be seen to reduce efficiencies.  
On the other hand, the closing of an unprofitable branch may be harmful to some CU members, 
not to mention harmful to the community. While it may increase their overall competiveness, a 
closure of any CU branch could break trust with their local members, harm the reputation of the 
CU, and ultimately be in opposition to a community logic. 
How, then, do CU decision makers perceive and navigate these potential competing pressures? 
In the next section I will outline some theories and frameworks to guide an empirical exploration 
of this question. 
  
25 
 
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
3.1  Chapter Overview  
As outlined in the previous chapter, CU decision makers are likely to experience competing 
pressures to become more bank-like through a focus on growth and efficiency, and at the same 
time to retain other social objectives like supporting community through providing local 
employment and economic development.  This chapter discusses how research in new 
institutional theory, governance, and hybrids can provide insights into how CU decision makers 
are likely to perceive and respond to these pressures. 
3.2 Institutional Logics 
Opposing pressures faced in organizations, such as those that CU decision makers are 
experiencing, have been studied in the literature as outcomes of conflicting institutional logics.  
Institutional logics (ILs) are “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, 
assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material 
subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton and 
Ocasio 1999, 804). When individuals encounter change, complex situations, or new ideas, they 
perceive and frame the issues through this lens, responding with the development of 
organizational strategies and practices that are consistent with the dominant institutional logic 
(Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012).   
As organizations experience growth and change, ILs influence their development through 
allocating decision-makers’ attention in a manner consistent with accepted norms (Thornton and 
Ocasio 1999). For individuals, ILs provide social identities, goals and schemas which both 
constrain and support behaviours and help frame perceptions (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 
2012) by providing ready-made means-ends prescriptions that focus on specific and appropriate 
issues and solutions (Thornton and Ocasio 2008).  
3.2.1 Hybrid Organizations 
If there is more than one IL present in an organization it will complicate this dynamic. 
Individuals in these “hybrid organizations” will have different lenses through which they 
perceive organizational situations (Pache and Santos 2010). Their choice of actions are, 
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consequently, less predictable; however, they also have a potential for greater innovation as they 
learn to combine elements of each IL (Battilana and Lee 2014).   
CUs are examples of hybrid organizations. They exist to provide high quality financial products 
and service solutions to their members at competitive prices.  This existence; however, is a result 
of a group of people committing to a common ideology, and their success has been a result of 
their membership’s shared belief in trust, honour and reciprocity. These community-based values 
have a strong impact on the direction of an organization (Battilana and Dorado 2010) and are 
consistent with examples of a community logic (Marquis and Lounsbury 2007; Almandoz 2012).  
In other words, CUs are subject to economic practices, rules and norms that are shared by all 
organizations operating within the financial services industry (financial IL) more broadly, such 
as investor-owned firms, but are guided by values and principles that support and promote the 
wellbeing of their communities through local social and economic development (community IL).   
These two logics can often be mutually complementary, prescribing similar actions that produce 
similar outcomes.  For example, CUs may embrace high quality customer service because it 
increases profits (financial IL) or they could adopt high quality customer service to improve the 
experiences of their members (community IL), which may still lead to higher profits.  In this case 
the actions and outcome are the same, regardless of which IL prompted them to act in this way, 
or the intended outcome.   
3.2.2 Conflict in ILs 
However, conflict is often an assumed condition when multiple logics are in play (Kraatz and 
Block 2008) since the adoption of practices that support one logic could directly oppose those 
supporting the other (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978).  Indeed, the presence of the financial IL and 
community IL in organizations has also been shown to result in conflicting demands on 
organizational actors (Marquis and Lounsbury 2007; Almondoz 2012).  This is understandable 
when one considers the differences in organizations that are traditionally associated with these 
ILs.  Organizations that are predominantly guided by financial ILs are influenced by principles 
associated with maintaining profitability through finding efficiencies and increasing market 
share.  Clearly defined processes and strict command-and-control hierarchies are norms in 
organizations sharing this logic, due to the highly regulated nature of the financial services 
industry.  This type of hierarchical structure exists in CUs.  When adhering to a financial logic, 
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organizational success can be measured through market positioning and various financial ratios.  
This logic has also been referred to as a banking logic (Kent and Dacine 2013), or a corporate 
logic (Zeff 2003).   
In contrast, organizations driven predominantly by a community IL adhere to principles 
promoting a commitment to community values, including investment in local communities.  
Organizations that tend to have this focus are often charitable organizations that have been 
developed to meet a social objective.  Profits and efficiencies in these organizations are seen as a 
means to an end rather than an end in itself. 
These pressures have been explored in research on co-operatives as the struggle between 
associative and membership needs (Ketilson 2006; Coté 2002).  It is a cyclical problem in which 
a co-operative, to meet its associative needs, will conform to industry norms through mimicking 
the models and strategies of its corporate counterparts.  Through this, the co-operative loses its 
responsiveness to members (membership needs) and acts less like a co-operative.  As a result, 
they lose their ability to effectively compete with conventional businesses and lose their 
membership (Coté 2002). 
CU decision makers are exposed to each of these ILs and may face the pressures where their 
beliefs and prescriptions conflict.  For example, it may be financially prudent for a CU to close a 
non-profitable branch to ensure greater organizational efficiency and profitability (financial 
logic); however, sustaining an unprofitable branch will ensure local members’ lives are not 
disrupted and would ensure readily available services for their members (community logic). 
When encountering these situations for the first time, it is likely that CU decision makers would 
struggle with these decisions.  Once addressed; however, the outcome of these conflicts could 
guide future decision-makers and impact the direction of an organization. 
How, then, do CU decision makers experience and navigate pressures from these different ILs 
when they are faced with them?  In earlier variants of new institutional theory, such conflict was 
often understood as representatives from different factions actively engaging in power struggles, 
each adhering to different ILs (Jay 2013; Zilber 2002).  An example of this was that of an Israeli 
rape crisis centre where conflict was experienced through two groups who supported opposing 
therapeutic and feminist logics (Zilber 2002).  A similar manifestation of conflict was observed 
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in the field of medical education through the clash of opposing coalitions supporting the care and 
science logics (Dunn and Jones 2010).  
Consumer co-operatives have been known to experience a form of paralysis when trying to 
reconcile their co-operative ideals with the realities of running a supermarket (Briscoe 1971).  
There are two types of leadership responses to these pressures identified in this literature: the 
trader and the idealist (Briscoe 1971).  Traders address their decisions through adhering to 
economic principles and will generally see the co-operative principles as a barrier to success.  In 
contrast, idealists adhere strictly to their co-operative principles and will compromise their 
economic principles.  Neither of these approaches in isolation will arrive at the best outcome for 
the co-operative (Briscoe 1971). 
3.2.3 Factors Influencing the Respective Strength of ILs 
Recent research tends to show decision-makers in hybrid organizations responding to these 
pressures in different ways, depending on the degree to which others within their organization 
identify with each institutional logic, and the comparative strength of each logic (Pache and 
Santos 2013; Besharov 2014; Kodeih and Greenwood 2014). Other factors that influence the 
impact of these pressures include organizational structure or design and human resources 
practices. These are discussed below. 
3.2.3.1   The Strength of Competing Logics 
The comparative strength of logics will vary based on the level of the logics’ contribution in 
organizational decision making (Heimer 1999) and the political strength of those in support of 
the logics (Yu 2013).  For example, if a CU’s senior decision makers, as well as the 
organization’s mission and values, are strongly rooted in a community IL, that IL is likely to 
have a more dominant role in the organization. 
Some ILs may be more or less influenced by other logics depending on their “permeability” or 
how loosely coupled or ambiguous they are (Kent and Dacine 2013).  An IL that is more 
ambiguous or holds internal contradictions is more “open” to transformation than a “strongly 
articulated alternative logic” (Kent and Dacine 2013, 763).  As actors within the organization 
seek to seek to interpret the ambiguities, they are more likely to draw on a known logic than 
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create a novel approach (Greenwood et al 2011).  Well-established ILs will provide clear criteria 
than can be used by institutional actors in reconciling contradictions (Kent and Dacine 2013).   
Based on this concept one could conceivably assess two competing ILs and offer a prediction as 
to which logic might eventually dominate the other through comparing the permeability of each 
logic. The banking logic is comprised of well-established quantitative measures (Thornton and 
Ocasio 2008). In their recent study of the microfinance industry, Kent and Dacine (2013) found 
the financial logic to be less permeable than the development logic due to its low ambiguity and 
tighter coupling.  As a result there was a long term institutional shift of power in favour of the 
financial logic.  This trend is often discussed as ‘mission drift’ and is commonly observed within 
the industry (Battilana and Dorado 2010).   
Similar to the development logic, a community logic would have less well-established metrics 
and is focused on principles and relationship building.   Based on the concept of permeability, it 
could be hypothesized that the financial logic would have a greater influence over the actions of 
decision-makers than the community logic.  
3.2.3.2 Organizational Actor Response 
Actors within hybrids are not only influenced by but also influence the balance of logics within 
organizations (Thornton 2004).  They have the ability to challenge practices, assumptions, and 
values that are deemed appropriate (DiMaggio 1997).  Especially within hybrid organizations, 
actors exercise a degree of agency through their ability to selectively choose from the 
perceptions, processes, and prescriptions associated with different logics (Besharov and Smith 
2014). 
What factors determine the response that each actor takes?  Pache and Santos (2013) suggest 
that, although the actions of the individuals are vital in determining the organization’s response 
to institutional logics, there has been little exploration into the micro foundations of institutional 
logics.  They suggest that individuals are motivated mainly by social acceptance concerns, and 
when observing perceptions and responses to the hybrid condition at the micro-level, individuals 
are predicted to respond though “ignorance, compliance, defiance, combination, or 
compartmentalization” (Pache and Santos 2013: 15).  Moreover, they propose that an 
organizational actor’s adherence to each logic will shape their response to competing logics, 
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depending on “hybridity of the context”, or the relative strength of competing logics in the 
organization (Pache and Santos 2013: 16). 
The degree to which individuals adhere to each logic is based on a combination of background 
factors including upbringing, social exposure, education, work experience and volunteer 
experience (Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury 2012).  As such, individuals can adhere to many 
different logics to various degrees.  Within their model, Pache and Santos (2013) outline the 
responses to two unspecified conflicting logics based on the degree to which an individual is 
novice (does not adhere), familiar, or identifies (highly adheres) with each respective logic.  For 
example, individuals who are novice with respect to both logics would likely be indifferent to 
both and are labeled “ingenuous members” (Pache and Santos 2013: 17).   
Individuals who strongly identify with multiple logics are labeled as “hybridizers.”  According to 
the authors, “hybridizers” are in a position where they can combine and adapt logics in ways that 
satisfy the needs of each (Pache and Santos 2013: 31). The complexity of opposing logics may 
be experienced as internal dissonance by such individuals as they reframe and incorporate 
incompatible expectations and contradictions from each logic in efforts to satisfy each of them 
(Golden-Biddle and Rao 1997).   
3.2.3.3 Structural Factors 
The least researched area in which institutional logics can influence and be influenced by 
organizations is through organizational structure and design. HR practices will influence 
organizations and employees in this way. The use of deliberate hiring and socialization practices 
helped sustain a balance of financial and development logics in the microfinance field (Battilana 
and Dorado 2010). Similarly, the creation of shared identity aspirations, or the identity that the 
organization would like to have, helped mediate opposing logics to enable a constructive balance 
of logics in French business schools (Kodeih and Greenwood 2014).  As such, organizational 
culture is an important factor that will impact an employee’s response. 
Organizational structures can also be used to compartmentalize opposing logics thereby isolating 
them from identity struggles and conflict (Kraatz and Block 2008), or to support confrontation 
between logics resulting in oscillation and/or innovation (Jay 2013). Such confrontation between 
logics has been shown to be beneficial.  For example, sustained productive tension from 
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conflicting logics in a group of microfinance branches resulted in greater success than in those 
branches that supported only one logic (Canales 2013).   
Beyond the above non-coercive mechanisms, it has been suggested that organizational 
governance might be necessary in navigating conflicting pressures and balancing the demands of 
groups supporting each logic (Kraatz and Block 2008; Jarzabkowski et al 2009; Pache 2011). In 
support of this hypothesis, Pache (2011) found that formal structures enabled hybrid 
organizations to balance competing logics better than those lacking that safeguard.  In her 
research, she examined the role of organizational members in shaping their organizations’ 
response to opposing institutional demands.  She observed that organizations that were founded 
by teams of individuals who identified with more than one logic were better able to mobilize 
resources from their different institutional environments.  Those more complex organizations, 
however, were also more likely to experience intense internal conflicts between coalitions 
supporting opposing logics, with the important exception of those who had designed a formal 
governance structure that determined how different coalitions made their voices heard.      
In Pache’s (2011) study the organizations that lacked formal structures experienced conflict 
between coalitions favoring each of the opposing logics due to a lack of consensus around 
organizational purpose.  Those with more formal structures in place were able to achieve a 
working balance that enabled one group a dominant position without sacrificing the 
representation of the other group’s interests. This study demonstrated the importance of 
governance in balancing competing institutional logics.  As such, there have been calls for 
further research on governance in hybrids (Pache 2011; Battilana and Lee 2014).  
3.3 Governance 
Governance has been defined as what “determines who has power, who makes decisions, how 
other players make their voice heard and how account is rendered” (Institute on Governance 
2015, para 2).  It is the “cognitive pattern or framework within which the exercise of power 
occurs” (Fairbairn, Fulton and Pohler, 2015). 
An organization’s raison d’être lies in the ability of a collective to surpass an individual’s 
decision-making limitations (Loasby 2001) at a lower cost than if performed by an individual 
(Coase 1937).  Individuals have cognitive and physical limitations that limit their ability to 
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accomplish time-bound and complex tasks (e.g., bounded rationality; Simon 1955) and are 
influenced by personal biases (Tversky and Kahneman 1974).  Organizations address this 
limitation through collectively harnessing the knowledge and information of individuals toward a 
common outcome (Loasby 2001).  However, beyond just simply pooling individuals’ 
knowledge, organizations are made up of systems with rules and authority structures to prioritize 
and share information (Kaplan 2008).  Thus, organizations act as “interpretative systems” (Daft 
and Weick 1984; Loasby 2001) though establishing operating rules and priorities.  This results in 
some stakeholder’s ideas and frames becoming more important than others and may bring about 
competition as individuals and groups compete with each other over the ability to influence the 
organization’s direction (Kaplan 2008). 
In this area, the relative power of the stakeholders will decide what frames will influence the 
organization’s direction.  In theory, a CU’s structure is designed to have its rules and priorities 
established and driven by its membership through a democratically elected board of directors.  In 
reality, the senior leadership team will also have substantial influence over the organization’s 
direction through their day-to-day actions.   
A CU’s direction and success is greatly influenced by the balance of power and authority 
possessed by these two groups, and how various strategic interdependencies and cognitive biases 
issues are resolved.  A key strategic interdependency between any board and its managers is the 
principal-agent problem, or getting the managers to act in the best interest of the owners rather 
than themselves (Schleifer and Vishny 1997). In CUs, the principal-agent problem, or the control 
problem (Cook 1995), is concerned with getting the manager to act in the best interest of the 
members.  CU board members (the principals) are elected representatives of the members and 
they, in turn choose the executive team, or managers (the agents).  On these types of boards the  
managers will generally have more in-depth knowledge of the functions and operations of the 
organization and the board’s knowledge may be limited to the information that is made available 
to them (Spear 2004).  Management’s years of experience managing similar organizations and 
their thorough knowledge of the CU and the complexities of its environment result in a balance 
of power that favours managers over members (Spear 2004).   
Other factors can also increase the information asymmetry in today’s CUs.  As a CU’s 
membership grows in size and diversity, it can become difficult for board members to connect 
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with the membership to fully understand its needs.  With employees in the branches reporting in 
on various metrics, managers have the ability to monitor these needs in an organized manner.  As 
a result, much of the board’s information about the CU and the membership is filtered through 
the managers. 
Traditional ways investor-owned banks address the principal-agent problem include incentive 
structures such as issuing shares and performance bonuses.  These can be less relevant to CUs.  
In addition to the fact that CUs lack tradable shares, CUs lack a single objective like profit-
maximization, and have several interrelated and sometimes conflicting goals.  Moreover, while 
banks report quarterly on their financial metrics, many CU objectives are more complex and 
ambiguous, or may have longer feedback loops.  These differences make the creation of targeted 
managerial incentives more complex, because the definition of organizational success is less 
clear and outcomes are more difficult to monitor (Fulton & Pohler 2015). 
These challenges make the formal governance structure and the establishment of accepted norms 
important for CUs.  The linkages from the members to the board and the board to the executives 
impact accountability and communication and determine who holds the power in the CU.  Board 
members who do not feel accountable to or receive feedback from the membership will be less 
likely to act in the interests of the members.  This accountability is enforced through bylaws and 
election rules, and feedback can occur through regular meetings and reports as well as other 
informal communication structures.  Voter apathy and/or inefficient communication are likely to 
reduce the efficacy of these linkages.   
In the same way, executives who do not feel accountable to or receive feedback from the board 
will be less likely to act in the interest of the board.  Accountability is enforced through 
employment contracts and feedback occurs through regular meetings, reports and other informal 
communication structures.  The respective knowledge of both groups will impact these linkages.  
For example a board that is less knowledgeable than its executives will have less information and 
feel less confident in making decisions that are counter to the executives' wishes, holding 
executives less accountable for their actions.  This deficiency would enable the executives 
greater influence in determining the CU’s direction through allowing them to choose which 
information gets prioritized and how it gets communicated.  
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In summary, the governance structures, practices and norms of a CU will ultimately be the most 
important factors in determining who has the power in the organization, which ultimately 
determines who makes decisions, how other stakeholders make their voices heard, and how the 
principals hold the agents accountable for meeting the desired objectives. 
3.4 CU Governance Basics 
The direction of a CU is heavily impacted by the power and authority structures within the 
organization. These power and authority structures are also influenced by the formal and 
informal rules and norms which determine who has the power to decide what in the organization. 
For these reasons, it is important to understand the formal organizational and governance 
structures of Canadian CUs. 
The basic CU organizational structure is made up of a board of directors that is elected from 
amongst the membership of the CU.  This board hires a senior manager (CEO) who, in turn, 
hires and manages an employee base which directly serves the membership’s needs.  This direct 
feedback loop is unique to co-operatives, as the members-owners are also the users of the 
services of the organization. The structure, also referred to as the centralized control structure 
(Hammond Ketilson and Brown 2011) is illustrated in figure 4-1. 
 
Figure 1- Centralized CU Organizational Structure 
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3.5 Recent Variations 
In response to an increasingly complex and changing regulatory landscape, as well as their own 
internal challenges, co-operative governance structures and practices have been evolving to 
better meet these new demands and circumstances (Cornforth 2011).  The increasing size and 
heterogeneity of a CU’s membership, as well as rising complexity and regulatory demands 
present challenges that could reduce the functionality of more traditional structures.  Larger co-
operative memberships are likely to be more diverse which will mean there will be greater 
differences in their needs for goods or services (Butler 1988).  Communication between each 
individual member and the board is less feasible and members may be less inclined to participate 
in organizational affairs.  As such, it is important that a well-developed structure exists to 
provide the proper mechanisms to ensure member control and engagement in these larger 
organizations (Butler 1988).   
Although there is no ideal organizational structure, there are benefits and drawbacks to different 
control structures.  In addition to the centralized control structure shown above, two other 
variations are common in CUs: the delegate control structure and the constituency control 
structure (Hammond Ketilson and Brown 2011).  In the delegate control structure, members elect 
delegates either regionally or on an at-large basis.  The constituency control structure is similar 
to the centralized control structure except that members will vote for board members within their 
regions. 
Some of Canada’s CUs have developed policies and procedures to ensure board competency, 
navigate complexity, mirror their membership’s geographic and demographic diversity and 
retain their democratic nature.   
3.5.1 Ensuring board competency 
A board that has the required knowledge skills and abilities will generally strengthen a CU’s 
performance (Brown 2007).  Lack of available technical expertise on the elected board will 
lessen their ability to effectively steer the direction of the organization vis-à-vis management.  In 
response to this potential problem, some provincial regulators have implemented, or are currently 
considering implementing policies that ensure specific competencies exist on CU boards.  Some 
CUs are responding to this issue and/or the related regulations by developing their own measures 
to ensure board competence. 
36 
 
Competent board members can be developed and maintained through targeted recruitment, 
training, and monitoring (Brown 2007).  Targeted recruitment can be administered as an internal 
response through nominating committees.  These committees will seek out new qualified 
nominees and assess all nominations based on required competencies.  They then recommend 
their chosen candidates to the membership prior to board elections.  Although this process 
increases the likelihood of electing board members with the necessary knowledge, skills and 
abilities, this process has the potential to undermine the CU’s democratic nature through 
procedural interference by current board members and/or management. This situation has 
recently surfaced in a non-financial Canadian co-operative, Mountain Equipment Co-operative 
(MEC).  MEC has introduced restrictive criteria in its board nomination bylaws, which limits the 
ability for an average member to be elected to its board of directors (Silcoff and Strauss 2015).  
This practice can also decrease the perceived legitimacy of the board among the membership 
since the board members may not be seen as being elected through a fair, democratic process.    
Some CUs also choose to increase board competency through ongoing assessment and education 
of board members and those considering board positions.  For example, Affinity Credit Union 
requires that their delegates maintain a minimum competency level in several areas such as 
financial literacy, strategic planning and community development (Affinity Credit Union, 2015).  
Although costly and time-consuming, this process reserves the right of all members, regardless 
of previous education or experience, to be nominated to the board of directors without procedural 
interference. 
3.5.2 Navigating complexity 
The growing complexity facing today’s large and growing CUs often requires the decision 
makers to have targeted in-depth knowledge in one or more areas.  Many CUs address these 
issues with the establishment of committees comprised of board members, executive members 
and general CU members.  These committees generally report to the board of directors and make 
recommendations in specialized areas such as human resources, risk management and 
governance.  For example, Coast Capital Savings Credit Union has an Audit and Finance 
Committee, Governance and Member Relations Committee, Human Resources Committee, Risk 
Review Committee and a Nominations Committee (Coast Capital Savings Credit Union 2015). 
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3.5.3 Reflecting membership diversity 
As a credit union grows through mergers, there is a threat that the needs and voices of minority 
groups and smaller branches might become less salient.  To ensure that the board is 
representative of the membership, some CUs make use of districts or regions in their 
organizational structure.  Members choose to elect one or more board member(s) from their own 
district.  Once elected, however, these board members are expected to represent the interests of 
the entire organization rather than just that of their own district.  Although largely based on 
geographical areas, districts could also include a specific type of member such as online-only 
members or members from a specific ethnic group.  For example, Affinity Credit Union has 
designated one of their districts a First Nations district. This district has locations on or near 
reserves and has kiosks in community stores. Through establishing this district, Affinity Credit 
Union is able to ensure this important demographic has a strong voice in the organization 
(Martin 2012). 
While the use of districts in organizational governance can ensure a better representation of the 
membership on the board, it can also result in an extremely large board of directors as the 
organization grows.  To mitigate this issue, some CUs have established more than one level of 
elections in which the membership elects delegates from their district who, in turn, elect 
representative(s) from their ranks to serve on the board of directors.  While still holding to the 
one-member one-vote principle, individual members are no longer directly electing the board of 
directors. 
3.5.4 Reinforcing democracy 
With all of the changes being implemented in today’s CUs, what happens to the democratically-
owned local control that is core to a CU’s co-operative principles?  As discussed above, many 
steps that serve to strengthen the organization can also risk diluting its democracy.  Additionally, 
low membership participation and engagement decreases the influence of members over their 
elected board which, in turn, can decrease the legitimacy of the board (Spear 2004) since the 
elected board was not elected by a majority of the membership.  Therefore, it is in the interest of 
the CU to ensure that its democratic nature and member participation is reinforced. 
Increasing membership participation is one means through which a CU’s democracy can be 
strengthened.  As such, CUs often reach out to their members through newsletters, social media, 
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polling, open forums, financial literacy programs, and other forms of communication.  There are 
several example of CUs adopting these initiatives. Servus Credit Union in Alberta publishes a 
quarterly online newsletter with updates on the credit union and helpful articles relating to 
financial services.  Conexus Credit Union in Saskatchewan is actively engaged in Twitter, 
updating its feeds with information on local events and helpful tips.  Atlantic Central, which 
represents CUs in the Atlantic Provinces, offers a free financial literacy program to local schools, 
women’s shelters and other organizations. Noventis Credit Union in Manitoba has online 
member surveys about membership experiences conducted both in their branches and online. 
Membership representatives can also be used to enhance the democratic nature of a CU.  These 
individuals are chosen from their communities to work regularly with board members and can 
enhance the flow of information in both directions.  Through their roles they communicate 
community concerns and ideas with board members and conduct CU-related discussions with 
their communities, thereby strengthening the linkage between the board and the membership. 
Transparency is a crucial component of a democratic organization.  In a CU the members need to 
be aware of the performance of the organization and the board to be able to effectively 
participate in monitoring.  As such, CU director and CEO remuneration, meeting attendance, and 
a report on the CU’s profits and strategic direction are generally provided to the membership 
regularly.  Additionally, reporting measures such as external auditing committees are used in the 
larger CUs to increase accountability of board members and the CU’s executives to the 
membership.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1  Introduction 
The aim of my thesis initially was to understand how CU decision makers perceive and respond 
to the increasing pressures they face in their organizations as a result of changes in the external 
environment and to regulatory policy in the financial services industry. In particular, I am 
interested in the impact that the governance of the CU has on how senior decision-makers 
perceive these pressures and the actions a CU will undertake. Given the nature of the research 
questions, I explore these issues in a qualitative interview-based case study of one credit union 
that is growing quickly through mergers. 
4.2 Participant Selection 
It was important to select a CU with a community focus that had been recently facing the 
pressures associated with growth and change.  All Canadian CUs had been experiencing changes 
relating to the industry and regulatory situation.  The Canadian CU involved in this study, 
(hereafter referred to as CCU) was chosen based on its size, its growth stage, and its relationship 
with its community.  CCU was one of Canada’s largest CUs and it had recently undergone an 
important merger that would have introduced significant governance challenges.  Its purpose, 
vision and mission all demonstrate a strong community-focus, and its growth was increasingly 
putting it in direct competition with major investor-owned banks, as well as with federal crown 
corporations.  The pressures facing CCU were quite substantial.  
Thirteen decision makers at CCU were interviewed.  This included the entire executive 
management team as well as five board directors.  The five board members included directors 
from the smaller credit unions that merged with CCU and ended up on the CCU board, as well as 
directors who were part of the CCU board prior to the mergers.  Both executive and board level 
decision makers were included in the study to gain a greater understanding of how the 
perceptions of the board and executives might be similar and/or different as it relates to different 
institutional logics and/or possible conflicts; it also allowed an exploration of the potential 
impact of the power dynamics that existed between managers and the board created by the 
governance structure, and how it impacted decision-making in CCU.   
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The executives consisted of individuals who lead each of the CU’s functional areas.  Past 
experiences and backgrounds differed between each executive.  While most of them had a long 
history with CUs or other co-operative organizations in general, most had also obtained work 
experience in investor-owned corporations or government crown corporations.  Each of the 
executives had received extensive training in strategically managing competitive, for-profit 
businesses through university education and/or through other internal training and/or 
professional development, and many had also received formal training on the co-operative 
model. These varied experiences would have exposed them to different dominant logics over the 
course of their careers.  This diversity in backgrounds is important because those sharing the 
same dominant logic might be more likely to perceive new circumstances through the same lens, 
resulting in a homogenous outlook.  
Since the way that individuals perceive and respond to organizational logics differs as one 
becomes more familiar and/or identifies more with each logic (Pache and Santos 2013), special 
effort was made to include board members with various tenures at CCU.  The resulting group 
included board members with decades of experience with CCU, as well as some that had recently 
joined CCU as a result of recent mergers. 
4.3 CCU’s Governance 
CCU had implemented several measures in efforts to mirror their membership’s geographic and 
demographic diversity, retain their democratic nature, ensure board competency and navigate 
complexity.  For confidentiality purposes, this report will not discuss each of their measures in 
detail; however, the main points will be described to assist the reader in understanding the design 
of the CU. 
Although it had grown significantly, both internally and through strategic partnerships, attempts 
to retain the democratic nature are evident in CCU’s structure and procedures.  CCU has adopted 
an organizational structure that is designed to strengthen the connection between the board and 
its members while enhancing the board’s representativeness.  Its membership is divided into 
several districts based on geography and other minority group considerations.  Each district 
elects its own delegates who, together, form the district council for each district.  Those delegates 
elect one or more director(s) from their district council, based on the district’s size, to the Board 
of Directors.  The figure below illustrates CCUs Organizational structure. 
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Figure 2 - CCU’s Organizational Structure 
Through the use of districts, branches in smaller geographical regions are still granted at least 
one voice on their local district council and, in turn, at least one vote in director elections.  This 
ensures that, even as the organization grows, smaller groups remain linked to CCU’s Board of 
Directors.  The resulting structure encompasses many people.  At the time of this study CCU’s 
structure held over 100 elected delegates and its board consisted of more than twenty directors.  
Compared to the traditional CU structure, this can be quite costly and can increase the time 
involved in making larger decisions.   
Education of CCU’s leaders begins at the delegate level.  Once elected, CCU delegates are 
encouraged to enhance their knowledge in related areas through internal and national CU 
training programs.  These individuals could be considered board members-in-training, as CCU 
assists them in attaining the competencies that they need in order to contribute successfully to 
their board and CCU as a whole.  Their knowledge assists them in acting as a central conduit 
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between the membership and CCU’s board of directors and enables them to make educated 
contributions to CCU’s direction.  Scheduled meetings bring together the delegates from around 
the province to discuss local concerns and to meet with the board.  This strengthens the feedback 
loop between the membership and the board. 
Once elected, board members receive ongoing relevant training to support them in their 
positions.  This strengthens their ability to provide valuable input into the direction of CCU.  
CCU has also established several joint committees to assist them in navigating the complexity in 
their industry.  These committees take advantage of the organization’s specialized knowledge 
and enable greater knowledge transfer between the executive team and board representatives.   
Thus, through CCU’s governance structure, they have strived to ensure an educated, 
representative board of directors with a reinforced, democratic linkage to their large and growing 
membership.  Additionally, this board has the additional support of specialized committees and 
educated, connected membership delegates. All of these actions help to strengthen the power and 
knowledge of the board relative to the executive team. 
4.4 Data Collection 
Contact with participants was initiated through one of the executives and organized through an 
administrative staff member.  Although the intent was to hold all interviews over the span of two 
months, participant and interviewer availability resulted in the final interview occurring 
approximately four months after the first set of interviews.  Interviews were semi-structured and 
lasted approximately one hour.  They were conducted by two interviewers, each with an 
understanding of the relevant theory and the contextual factors pertaining to this study. 
4.4.1 Interview Questions 
A set of five to nine open-ended questions were used to guide the interview process and are 
listed in Appendix 1.  These questions evolved over the span of the project based on patterns in 
the responses.  For example, the first question inquired about the decision maker’s perceptions of 
the effects of the 2008 financial crisis as well as CCU’s response to the crisis.  The crisis has 
been a major focal point within the financial services industry and, although it may not have led 
to immediate changes at CCU, it has been the catalyst for ongoing changes.  Although our intent 
was to learn about how the participants perceive and respond to these changes, responses tended 
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to be purely factual and mainly included stories about technological change.   As such, we chose 
to drop this question in the later interviews. 
We chose to insert a question about the participants’ backgrounds after the first round of 
interviews.  When we were reflecting on the questions, we realized that we would be missing 
that context when we would later analyze the responses.  When confronted by new situations, 
individuals respond based on past experiences and the logics to which they have been exposed.  
As such, understanding one’s background is an important contextual factor when analyzing their 
response to change and uncertainty. 
Another design evolution occurred in questions about conflict.  The initial set of interviews 
included a question asking, “Have you experienced any conflicts arising from the increasing 
growth?”  The participants found this question confusing, particularly because of the word 
“conflict”.  They would respond defensively, objecting that such conflict did not exist.  Through 
this experience, we learned that questions that focused on specific situations are better suited to 
prompt discussions around conflict.  For example, in an early interview a participant brought up 
the “difficult” situation surrounding less profitable branches.  It became evident that this was an 
area where the logics presented opposing actions and each of the participants clearly struggled 
between the available options.  As such, we would bring up this type of situation as a follow-up 
question to the “conflict” question and, eventually, we just removed the “conflict” question 
altogether and replaced it with one that specifically discussed that situation. 
Another area in which conflict was discussed was competition between CUs.  This situation 
could cause tension between the two logics: the financial logic to increase market share and the 
community logic to establish “co-operation between co-operatives”.  It was brought up early in 
one of the interviews by one of the participants in a story.  When we asked other participants 
about it they tended to brush it off as unimportant.  This consistently changed, however, when 
we directly asked about a specific situation in which another CU seemed to have engaged in a 
competitive action.  As such, this direct approach tended to bring about more open reactions. 
In addition to questions around conflict and changes, the last of the initial set of questions was to 
find out how the interviewees perceived their CU’s identity.  Organizational identity guides 
decision makers through dictating a logic of appropriateness (March 1991) and identity 
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aspirations can drive actors within organizations to pursue actions in line with what they wish to 
become (Kodeih and Greenwood 2014).   The financial logic originates within banks so 
understanding the interviewees’ perceptions surrounding CCU’s difference from banks was 
intended to help in understanding how they distinguish themselves from that mindset.  
Additionally, this question was to determine if their focus is on whom they are or who they wish 
to become.  
Sub questions were used to direct the participants toward previously identified themes.  Often 
these would vary based on the backgrounds or positions of the participants.  For example, new 
board members were asked about their experience during the mergers and executives were asked 
questions relating to their specific areas of expertise. 
4.5 Data Analysis 
Notes were taken throughout the interviews to assist in generating follow-up questions and to 
make note of physical responses to questions.  All interviews were recorded, transcribed, and 
analyzed by the student interviewer.  Per ethics requirements, the transcripts were made available 
to the participants following the interviews to allow them to add, clarify, or modify their 
responses. 
4.5.1 Grounded Theory 
A grounded theory analysis process was used, as described by Hsieh and Shannon (2005).  This 
seemed appropriate since little theory exists surrounding the balancing of institutional logics in 
co-operative organizations, particularly as it relates to governance.  Data analysis began during 
the interviews.  Along with recording the conversations, I made notes about participant reactions 
and put forward additional questions based on the emergence of common themes or new ideas 
related to the themes. 
The interviews were transcribed verbatim and areas relating to predetermined themes were 
highlighted with distinct colours.  Emerging themes were also given distinct colours and were 
analyzed based on their relation to the other themes.  Special effort was made to ensure the 
context of the question was considered throughout the analysis.  I would reread each transcript 
and go back to the original recording whenever the intent or context was in question.   
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Original themes that had surfaced during the prior research and literature reviews included 
conflict, change, culture, and the financial and community logics, but I also searched for 
repetitive ideas that may not have been highlighted in previous research.  When I noticed certain 
ideas repeating, especially in connection to anticipated themes, I would note these additional 
themes and search for them during subsequent readings of all transcripts.  One such theme that 
continued to surface in relation to each of the main themes was CCU’s organizational 
governance.   
4.5.2 Grouping Based on Commonalities 
Initially I had anticipated different responses between participants based on their length of 
service with CCU or whether they were board or executive members; however, I could not find 
any distinguishable difference between these groups in each of the theme areas.  This could be 
due to the small sample size.  As such, all responses were grouped together.   
4.5.3 Bias Considerations 
With this type of approach there is a risk that the personal bias of the researcher impacting the 
analysis.  In this situation, I had almost no experience with co-operatives or credit unions and 
had a history working in business.  I was inclined toward a financial or business logic and was 
likely to have biases that support that way of thinking.   
As a check against this bias and its related assumptions, regular discussions occurred with my 
supervisor.  She had different biases due to her history with both investor-owned firms and co-
operatives, and had different perspectives.  Since she was present in the interviews and 
throughout the process, she was also able to ensure that the contextual factors were respected in 
the writing and interpretation of the results.  
4.5.4 Identifying ILs in Interviews 
In interpreting the comments and reactions of the participants, it was important that the 
characteristics of institutional logics were considered.  How does the researcher determine 
whether or not a particular IL is influencing a specific behaviour or response, or whether it is 
even an IL that she is observing?  When responding based on institutional logics, individuals act 
in a deterministic manner consistent with the rules and norms practiced by others in other 
organizations and situations that share that logic. When participants spoke about the pressures 
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associated with financial outcomes and achieving efficiencies, or their actions relating to those 
pressures, these discussions were considered to be related to a financial logic.  In the same way, 
discussions relating to a need or pressure to be true to co-operative principles, and/or concern 
over community needs,  were considered to be related to the community logic. 
There were times in which both pressures were discussed in these interviews.  During such 
conversations, sometimes referred to as “difficult decisions,” there would be noticeable pauses 
that were inconsistent with the automatic responses that are attributed to an individual being 
influenced by an institutional logic.  Participants demonstrated a struggle or an effort to work 
through these decisions rather than the taken-for-granted automatic response that is normally 
attributed to institutional logics. These reactions were interpreted as symptoms of inner conflict 
based on the conflicting points of view that were being discussed and the effort that the 
interviewee was exerting during those moments.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
5.1 “In a New Sandbox” 
CCU board members and executives consistently discussed their environment as being in a state 
of change, and that the realities they face now are vastly different than what had faced CCU 
when it began.   
So there is more compliance and more reporting to do there.  There's certainly more to 
do with information technology.  That's part of the competitive environment, so you have, 
um, like, the ever increasing pace of change.  It was nothing ten years ago compared to 
today… (Executive E) 
It will all be electronic so that’s a huge change I think – In how fast everything is 
happening and keeping up to society or whatever the consumer wants and maybe even 
demands.  They want it cheaper, faster, yesterday is basically what the consumer is 
looking for.  Our challenge is to keep up to that pace and be relevant and all that kind of 
stuff. (Executive G) 
In addition to their industry changes, CCU’s growth has presented challenges: 
The bigger we get, the more we are perceived as a bank or we act like a bank.  I know 
that we, I know in years past we could turn on a dime.  That’s not true today.  There’s 
nothing easily done now today with 900 employees.  You know there was a time when I 
could walk down on the banking floor and I knew all of them, right.  That doesn’t exist 
now so the mere fact of communicating to our staff becomes something huge.  So 
introducing a new product becomes something huge.  So the turnaround time to do 
anything, certainly is a challenge to us so I think communication, the size we are, keeping 
our staff all on the same page – those are all going to be challenges for us as we go 
forward.  And we’re in a new sandbox.  We don’t know how to play in this sandbox yet.  
Right?  We’ve tripled our size in a period of about 5 years. (Executive F) 
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5.2 Where logics balance 
In most cases, the financial and community ILs have been blended in CCU in ways that are 
mutually supportive or complementary in addressing these changes.  For example, through 
embracing a financial logic, the organization is able to achieve the profitability necessary for 
ensuring financial returns for members and for supporting the community in a real and 
meaningful way.   
I think that we are now giving back more to our communities than we did when we were 
small credit unions and it’s been more stable community giving, I guess, going back and 
one other thing I think that people don’t realize is the branch is still open.  It may not 
have been if we hadn’t have done some of these mergers.  To me that’s the biggest 
community win – we’re still in the community. (Board Member A) 
In the same way, CCU’s community focus has enabled the organization’s success as a business. 
…the trick is to take our values and ensure that they align with our members and their 
values… over the years that’s been the tried and true test for us.  If we legitimately do 
things that are good not only for helping our members achieve personally but help their 
communities thrive and grow and be successful then we typically succeed in those 
markets.  (Executive J) 
Sentiments such as these were echoed throughout the interviews when CCU’s executives and 
board members were discussing CCU’s past actions and broad concepts such as organizational 
values. 
5.3 Difficult decisions 
However, change has also introduced situations where sustained balance between the two logics 
has not yet been realized.    
Things are changing though – hours are changing.  I know, banks, some of our staff 
would be upset if we had to open up on Sundays but that’s where we may have to go in 
the future, right?  And the banks have gone there and I’m not sure the banks think as 
much about their culture or their employee culture as shareholder dividends, right?  So 
those are some of the decisions we’ll have to make longer term and they, again, are also 
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values-driven.  It isn’t just financial or competitive driven.  We also have to revisit our 
values and how do we balance the two. (Executive L) 
The changing industry, technology and social attitudes have triggered situations in which the 
logics prescribe opposing strategies that most of the CCU decision makers have not yet found 
ways to rationalize, resulting in paradoxes and conflict. 
…it will be a challenge to continue to be profitable enough to be strong, so that (the 
CFO) can sleep at night, um, and then to be relevant to the members and, ah, and still 
give back, and still be true to our grass roots and that's giving back to communities. 
(Executive M) 
The term “conflict” was not often used nor even considered applicable in these situations.  
Instead the interviewees often mentioned “difficult decisions” or “hard choices”.   The 
interviewees all seem to experience these conflicts as an internal struggle within themselves.  
This occurred when discussing competition with other credit unions and the possibility of closing 
unprofitable branches.  
5.3.1 Competition among Co-operatives 
Co-operatives generally accept and abide by seven internationally agreed upon principles (ICA 
2013; see Appendix B).  The sixth principle, entitled “co-operation among co-operatives” 
encompasses the ideal that co-operatives best serve their members and the co-operative 
movement through working together with other co-operative organizations. Consistent with a 
community logic, this principle promotes harmonious relationship-building and the development 
of strong social ties.  It could also run counter to a financial logic, particularly if other co-
operative organizations are seen to be threatening the financial returns of another co-operative or 
stifling a CU’s growth through limiting membership growth.  That paradox seemed to be facing 
the decision makers at CCU. 
In the past, each geographically-bounded community would have its own CU or a group of 
smaller communities would share one.  Over time; however, many of those smaller CUs have 
merged into a lesser number of larger, growing CUs.  As a result of its mergers and growth, CCU 
is now positioned in many communities, some of which are also occupied by other large growing 
CUs.  As such, other CUs are concurrently offering the same services and vying for the same 
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customers in the same locations.  CCU interviewees had different perceptions surrounding their 
competitive situation and how it fits with the sixth co-operative principle.  Most acknowledged 
that competition existed to some degree: 
You’d like to think that co-operation amongst co-operatives would mean that there 
wouldn’t be but there is and I think you just have to take the high road and deal with it 
like you would any other competition I suppose.  You don’t want to make enemies 
because they’re a sister organization but in the larger centres there’s a number of 
different credit unions.  (Board Member C) 
Competition with fellow credit unions was also expressed as an inevitable consequence of 
growth.  When asked if he anticipated competition to increase as the credit unions within the area 
grow larger, one board member responded: 
Well, yes, if the population stays static, because you have to grow and the only way you 
can grow is through acquisition of more members and increased asset size.... as the 
population grows... there's new client potential right there, and so, you can grow with 
them.  You can grow your business that way. (Board Member K) 
The majority, however, dismissed the idea of any competition between CCU and other credit 
unions, stating that the impression of competition was overstated.  When asked about possible 
competitive actions between CCU and another credit union, a CCU executive stated: 
To that end, others will make... from time to time journalists will take a run at... it’s not in 
reality an issue for us. The CEOs of all the larger credit unions are not only 
acquaintances; I’d say we’re friends.  So there’s no animosity.  (Executive J) 
This was echoed by another executive: 
We’re all part of the same organization.  I don’t see much conflict.  In fact our members 
don’t like to see it.  Sometimes our members are members of more than one credit 
union... I don’t see any - our competition are the banks.  (Executive B) 
One board member was particularly passionate about the need to work together: 
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Why not share the resources and put ourselves ahead of the banks rather than saying, 
“I’m not going to talk to them because they might get there before us” – and then you 
both lose.  So I think it’s just a no-brainer.  You have to work together.  (Board Member 
D) 
Despite the competitive pressures that other credit unions could present to their organization, 
most CCU decision makers have consciously chosen to view other CUs as allies rather than 
competition. To this end, CCU consciously chooses to not directly target members of other credit 
unions.  They have even avoided expanding into an area that is dominated by another credit 
union in order to respect the other credit union’s boundaries.   
Such deliberate tactics could either demonstrate that these decision makers have found a way to 
assimilate two logics or have deliberately chosen the community logic over the financial one.  
Further interview evidence supported the former reason.  Choosing to co-operate with other 
credit unions that would otherwise be deemed competition has resulted in a national initiative 
among CUs that has produced innovations that have enabled the CUs to better compete head-on 
with the major Canadian banks.   
One CCU Executive described other CUs as both competitors and allies: 
But at the end of the day, we’re separate institutions and believe we each have our own 
value proposition and that’s why there’s more than one credit union in the province or in 
Canada.  So we don’t focus on the credit unions as competitors.  We actually work 
relatively close with our fellow credit unions, either both provincially and nationally.  If 
we look at development initiatives, we’ll work together.  The HR group gets together on 
best practices.  We share compensation information.  We share, you know, what we’re 
doing on benefits or policies.  We do a lot of work on the IT side on the national 
perspective.  So yes, we may compete with our fellow credit unions, but we also work 
collaboratively, recognizing that we are part of a larger movement in Canada. (Executive 
L) 
One board member spoke of the importance of working with other credit unions and the 
importance of communication in navigating those relationships: 
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I mean other than saying communication is really important and people have to move 
beyond protecting their turf to become more visionary in terms of where we want to be in 
10 or 20 years or... you know.  Somewhere, a generation or two down the road.  Because 
without being visionaries we’re, I think, to some degree doomed. (Board Member H) 
Therefore, CCU has been able to satisfy the prescriptions of both financial and community logics 
with regard to the sixth co-operative principle, co-operating with other co-operatives.  Their co-
operation with other large credit unions toward mutually beneficial community and financial 
aims has enabled collective progress and greater competitiveness for Canadian credit unions than 
they could have achieved through simply competing over local locations and members.   
5.3.2 Unprofitable branch closure 
A difficult situation that repeatedly surfaced in the interviews was what to do with less profitable 
or unprofitable branches.  As described by one board member: 
The other big thing, I think that we're looking at, is:  how do we manage, uh, the 
organization and services for people in communities that aren't growing?  That, where 
we're not seeing a large amount of productive use of the money?  OK, so we're not 
making anything in this community, and now that's strictly looking as an organization, 
right?  How do we manage that?  How do we provide services to those people and 
continue to keep them meaningfully engaged as Credit Union members?  And so, that's 
going to be a big challenge for us as well. (Board Member K) 
As towns decrease in population, the number of members shrinks, and it becomes more difficult 
to recruit competent employees.  Fewer members result in lower profits and, eventually, could 
lead to financial losses for that branch.  Those subscribing to a financial logic would support the 
closing of non-profitable branches in order to ensure the best overall return for the CU and the 
majority of its membership.  In contrast, community logic pressures urge the decision makers to 
keep the branch open to support the local community and the few members remaining, despite 
the financial sacrifice.  As such, several of the interviewees struggled with questions surrounding 
this scenario.   
When the interviewees assessed the situation the pressures of both logics were continuously 
voiced: 
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So, I mean, we do need our profits, but, if you were just looking at branching, [a charter 
bank] might have closed those branches down a long time ago, because the shareholder 
wants a different dividend.  But our members are in those communities and they might 
forego a dividend.  They would rather us have the presence.  So that is where we might be 
a little bit different. (Executive E) 
When discussing the potential of branch closures, both board members and CCU executives were 
struggling with complexity of the situation and CCU’s purpose.  For example, one CCU 
executive questioned the length at which CCU would go to ensure a branch would stay open. 
As you try to be efficient, be relevant to the members, if you have branches that are six 
kilometres apart, that branch is actually the only thing left opened on Main Street.  Are 
we like a crown corporation, like (local Crown Corporation), who has a public policy 
mandate?  Being in every single little small community in the province to get those 
services out?  Like Telecom, do we do the same with financial services?  When everyone 
else has turned out the lights, including the (Crown Corp) and the grocery store.  Are we 
always going to be last? (Executive E) 
In many of the smaller communities, the CCU remains one of the last employers, making the 
prospect of closing a branch that is less financially viable particularly difficult to consider.  This 
fact seemed to weigh heavy on some of the interviewees: 
I was just thinking it’s kind of like having the elevators in rural communities.  It’s bad if 
you’re the first one out but it’s even worse if you’re the last one out. (Board Member C) 
…numbers are really important but what do credit unions really mean to those 
communities, in particular, when we’re the only financial institution in town.  There’s [a 
number of] communities in [the province] where we’re the only guy to do banking with.  
(Board Member D) 
Closure of a branch could impact more than the community and CCU’s bottom line, as was 
alluded to by one board member when he was discussing the branch closures: 
You can really create some negative image impacts for yourself if you’re (pauses) so 
there’s risk. (Board Member C) 
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Closure of a branch would demonstrate to members and staff that they are willing to resort to this 
extreme measure.  This action could be threatening to their membership, as many of their 
members come from smaller communities.  More importantly, such actions run counter to the 
norms of a community logic which centres on community sustainability and local relationship 
building.  Branch closures threaten a CU’s reputation among members, staff and other 
stakeholders who subscribe to that logic.  The interviewees saw the situation as becoming of 
greater importance in the near future and stated that they may soon have to directly face this 
difficult choice.   
That’s gonna be a big project and we’re gonna have to look at our whole branch network 
and kind of, not piecemeal it but have broad objectives to achieve.  So we haven’t fully 
gone down that path.  We’ve started but the tough decisions are in the future but it’s 
going to be holistic – whole look at the whole credit union rather than just picking here 
there and everywhere… We haven’t gone too deep into it yet.  It’s gonna make some 
interesting board meetings – I know that for sure.  Especially when it hits home or when 
it’s your own local credit union in your community.  Close to home it’s always harder. 
(Board Member A) 
5.4  How are these balanced? 
Why would CCU decision makers avoid competing with other credit unions and closing 
struggling branches, despite the norms within their industry?  What is behind their decision to 
keep struggling branches open while banks and other successful CUs have chosen to close 
theirs? In other words, what keeps CCU from subscribing completely to a financial logic and 
becoming more bank-like?  How do CCU board members balance the competing pressures to 
come to a different answer? 
Individuals are influenced by the logics that they are exposed to through life experiences, 
education and other factors.  Research has demonstrated that employees coming from specific 
backgrounds are likely to identify strongly with related logics, possibly resulting in conflict when 
facing alternative logics.  Organizations can have some control over this through deliberate use 
of HR practices (Battilana and Dorado 2010).  Through the interviews, it is apparent that CCU 
has been doing this for years.    
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5.4.1 “It’s in our DNA” 
Identity aspirations can influence the actions taken in organizations (Kodeih and Greenwood 
2013).  This was evident at CCU.  When discussing past decisions and future outlooks, CCU’s 
decision makers would often explain their actions as related to CCU’s identity.  These actions 
were always ones that favoured a community logic and tended to be idealistic and demonstrate 
pride.  For example, when questioned about the CCU’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
practices, one executive was quite passionate in his response, stating: 
I mean we have no choice but to, to get excited about corporate social responsibility, 
because we're a co-operative, for crying out loud, right? (Executive F) 
Similarly, an executive team member without a long history with credit unions or co-operatives 
discussed community giving as a basic part of CCU’s identity. 
I mean we have had a long tradition of giving back to the community – it’s our 
differentiator. It’s arguably in our DNA.  I don’t think, or at least in my tenure, I haven’t 
seen a time when that’s been fundamentally questioned. (Executive I) 
This focus on the ideal co-operative identity is not coincidental.  In fact, it is deeply established 
in the organization’s past and reinforced through ongoing HR practices.  For example, a 
commitment to serving the community through professional, locally-focused financial services is 
evident in CCU’s mission, vision and corporate values.  Directly in their values, CCU lists the 
seven internationally agreed upon co-operative principles (ICA 2013; see Appendix B), 
demonstrating commitment to their co-operative roots.  Throughout the interviews, board 
members and the executive management team referred to these principles as the force behind 
many of their beliefs and actions.   
CCU demonstrates these values through its community giving.  Interviewees asserted that 
initiatives at CCU differ from the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives undertaken 
by banks.  They held that CCU’s close community connection has enabled them to spot where 
their support can best contribute to their community’s needs.  For example, a CCU executive 
discussed their response to flooding in one of their communities: 
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When (a community) had the flooding we were able to, through our local people, be there 
and support and provide pizza to the people that were on the line with sandbags for 
example.  You don’t see a big corporate bank doing that and it’s because we know what’s 
going on in our local communities.  I think that’s the difference.  I think the other 
difference is that we put money back into communities – not in what I call the “pretty 
charities” or the nice places to show up with a cheque.  (Executive F) 
These values are reinforced in CCU’s employees, who are not only encouraged, but are expected 
to take part in activities that promote community-mindedness.  For example, CCU has an 
employee community donation program in which employees donate company money to a charity 
of their choice.  When asked about the participation within the program one CCU executive 
stated: 
… about 90% take advantage.  And I remind them. I’ve gotten to the point now where I 
remind them quarterly “have you done it?”  And I know who’s done it so I can sort of 
target some of the people if they haven’t.  It just amazes me that they don’t. (Executive F) 
Even CCU’s headquarters was created as a physical representation of organization’s values.  
Reinforcing the values of environmental stewardship, strict environmental standards were 
followed in its creation.  Its structure was also designed with the executive offices on the ground 
floor and common areas on the top floor to promote a feeling of equality.  That sentiment is 
echoed in the rush parking with no reserved stalls.  As described by a CCU executive: 
That was a cultural change in that, there was a time when old-school thinking when 
parking was reserved for managers and the like and that’s not the culture that we are 
about in the current version of CCU. (Executive J) 
5.4.2 “Semantics” 
Consistent with their focus on equality, CCU decision makers refer to the acquisition of smaller 
credit unions as “partnerships.”  It became apparent early on in the interviews that CCU’s 
decision makers did not feel comfortable with the term “acquisition.”  When asked about the use 
of the term, an executive explained: 
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For semantics.  If I was going to get the semantics right, it's an acquisition.  Under new 
accounting rules, we are actually buying credit unions in the same way we would go buy 
an office tower.  But that is not part of credit union culture. ..  We would just never use 
words that ugly.  We just never would.  So when we say partnership, it really is.  We are 
partnering with you; we are including you as a new district of (CCU).  But you are not 
assimilated.  You still have something that's very tangible and real and grass roots that 
you get to keep.  So that is different than a merger where we just, I don't know, just 
steamroller over and just say that we will just pick up the pieces we want and then we 
will leave the rest.  I think it really is a partnership when you say things like a loss of 
employment or requirement to relocate.  Those are more partnership words than we're 
just going to acquire you and we will triage it after.  It's definitely different. (Executive E) 
5.4.3 Carefully chosen “Partnerships” 
With all this effort to design and promote a culture that is consistent with the values of co-
operatives, it is not surprising that CCU decision makers put special effort into ensuring that 
partnering CUs hold the same values.  Interviewees consistently stated that partnerships are 
carefully chosen based on three main factors:  location, like-mindedness and financial viability; 
however, when pressed further, financial viability was often considered less important than the 
first two factors.  As one executive stated:   
I would say, mostly, we're looking at, the qualities we would look for is a fit.  A fit in 
corporate culture, a fit in perceptions around community and around governance... We 
could look at their capital position, we could look at how many branches they have, we 
could look at the things they haven't accomplished, or all the things they do really well.  
That matters a little less, because those things are, you can get past them.  They are not 
forever road blocks and we can come to agreements on pricing and products and policies 
and procedures, but it's that governance tone and the way that we feel about community 
and the way we deal with our members, seems to be the driving force.  Because we have 
partnership, partnered with some credit unions that are from a financial standpoint, not 
very strong at all. (Executive E) 
Put differently, one board member offered: 
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I think, kinda coming back to our co-operative roots, we’re not gonna leave some 
somebody out there hanging to dry, you know… I think the most important thing is like-
mindedness.  You need to have the same values, vision for what you see the organization 
being.  If oil and water don’t mix, even though you may be a credit union there’s different 
philosophies on what do you focus your priorities on ... (Board Member C)  
When asked to define the values discussed within this context, the board member elaborated: 
I think, for us, well our governance is an important one – it sets us apart.  Co-operative 
roots are also important.  There’s some credit unions that are maybe a little less co-
operative.  They’re more of a financial institution and what have you.  That’s fine for 
them – there’s nothing wrong with that but it’s not our outlook on things. (Board Member 
C)  
This idea of the “less co-operative” credit union was echoed throughout the interviews, 
especially when discussing partnerships with other credit unions.  For example, another board 
member stated: 
I guess you have to look at their branch philosophy and their governance philosophy and 
member service philosophy and make sure it fits with how we’ve been doing business.  If 
they’re a credit union that’s more bank-like versus credit union-like I guess we’d struggle 
with it. (Board Member A) 
As a result, CUs that do not share CCU’s community focus or are “maybe a little less co-
operative” are avoided when CCU considers partnerships.  This is intentional, as discussed by an 
executive:  
But as long as people’s values sets are the same, it’s just a matter of figuring out what 
that balance should look like.  We’ve not partnered with anyone who’s in conflict with 
that so it hasn’t been an issue for us. (Executive J)  
Based on their descriptions it was apparent that the “bank-like” CUs have a balance of logics that 
favours the financial side over the community.  CCU is able to avoid the conflict from these 
conflicting logics through choosing CUs that share a similar balance of logics.   
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It’s surprisingly non-confrontational.  There’s no difference of opinions per se, you might 
think we should invest a little more or a little less in terms of community versus what we 
can do... a better price for members versus we do so much in the communities and what’s 
the trade-off.  (Executive J) 
As would be expected, the partnerships transition relatively smoothly, with all decision makers 
sharing similar mindsets.  One of the newest board members reflected his and his colleagues’ 
experience surrounding his CU’s recent merger with CCU: 
We’ve had nothing but positive comments sitting around the board table.  It just feels like 
we were back at our original credit union.  We feel right at home here and quite 
comfortable so those kinds of comments are great.  It’s amazing how similar we are – 
even the little credit unions to a big one are quite similar about how things are. (Board 
Member A) 
5.4.4 Training - “Webinars and Stuff” 
Training is another important way in which CCU reinforces organizational values.  Classes are 
available to credit union employees through their national credit union association.  As described 
by one CCU executive: 
“Well we’re lucky in the credit union system that the CUDA training is very robust so 
we’ll immediately, any time anyone is elected, they are immediately enrolled in level A 
which is the beginning.  But we would do one-offs with them.  We have a co-op principles 
and traditions committee of the board and (the CFO) actually is the senior vice president 
that supports that.  And we will offer webinars and stuff that delegates can log into and I 
just track who is taking what.  So if that’s a low on their competency than I’d just make 
sure that that’s happening.  Of if something else was happening where we had (a co-
operative) conference, lots of delegates attended that weren’t familiar with co-operatives. 
(Executive F) 
As part of this training system, decision makers are expected to receive ongoing training in the 
competencies that they require, whether they are in financial literacy, risk, or other related areas.  
Although external training is available and accessed by CCU executives, they make use of this 
comprehensive CU-based educational program and track participants’ progress.   
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This benefits CCU in two ways.  First, external financial training would often be administered by 
bodies that are strongly immersed in the financial logic.  Training through a CU body ensures 
that the training received is in line with co-operative principles.  Second, rather than searching 
outside the organization for individuals such as accountants, financial analysts, or lawyers to act 
on the board of directors, CCU is able to cultivate and train them to meet the industry standards.  
This enables their CU to function democratically, yet be run by individuals that have the 
knowledge necessary to ensure authority over the organization.  
I think we are, as board members, obligated to further our education in as many specific 
skill sets as we can to deflect that sort of notion – that we don’t have the skills to be 
effective board members.  I mean in that context the credit union system does have a very 
good set of opportunities for various kinds of skill development and various levels of 
development in terms of director skills. (Board Member H) 
5.4.5 Tenure 
Tenure at CCU is quite high with 65%-70% of their positions staffed internally.  Long tenure 
tends to cultivate greater organizational identification among employees (Rousseau and Parks 
1993).  CCU’s human resources practices that are aimed at rooting their organizational culture in 
a community mindset are reinforced and strengthened over the tenure of these employees. This 
further solidifies the importance of the community in all organizational transactions.    
5.5 “A Connection Back to the Local Communities” 
All interviewees had internalized CCU’s values and aspired to emulate the ideals of the co-
operative identity.  However, when asked about situations that involved “difficult decisions” 
their responses were not focused on achieving the co-operative ideal.  Rather, CCU’s governance 
kept surfacing as a mechanism that forced a balanced approach.  This was discussed differently 
by board members than the executives.   
5.5.1 The Executives 
When discussing difficult decisions, the executives would mention the connection of the board 
member to their communities as well as their own personal incentives to find an acceptable 
option.  For example, when asked about why she thought that CCU tends to focus more on 
61 
 
community support than other CUs, an executive responded with, “Why do we give more?  
Because our board of directors are from here.  (Executive B) 
Executives receive their direction from the board members and serve both an administrative and 
strategic purpose in CCU.  Whereas the board of directors is engaged in macro-level decisions 
such as strategic and financial planning, regulatory compliance and stakeholder satisfaction, the 
executives’ role is in strategically enacting the board’s direction and managing day-to-day 
operations.   
The executives are more likely than the board to be influenced by pressures associated with a 
financial logic, due to their duties and backgrounds.  To have the expertise necessary in fulfilling 
their duties, they would have been exposed to financial and business logics through their 
education and past work history.  Their duties and responsibilities also expose them to pressures 
surrounding finding efficiencies and managing growth and risk.  Without established rules and 
procedures, these pressures could encourage decision makers to consider “legitimated” strategies 
and tactics that have been engineered and perfected by banks.  Finally, in contrast to the 
community embeddedness of the board members, executives and their administration are now 
centrally located in a head office.  One executive voiced concerns over this newer arrangement: 
We’ve come from a culture where we were distributed.  We were sitting in a branch so 
that a member could honestly walk in and walk into my office if they wanted to.  That’s 
not going to happen here… So the issue for us is how do we, how does senior 
management get out and actually get into branches. .. Where it really happens is on the 
branch floor or the teleservice so how do we get out and interface with those folks so we 
honestly know what’s going on.  I think that’s going to be the challenge for us.  
(Executive F) 
As a way to mitigate any pressures to become more bank-like, the executives are held 
accountable to standards set out in their balanced scorecard.  This document is developed to 
identify and rank CCU’s priorities; executive incentives are created in line with this document.  
…our board says, “here’s how important this one is” and “here’s how important this one 
is” and we get judged on that accordingly… We’re measured around members, around 
community, around financial, around employees.  (Executive I) 
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When you have policy driving how much you put back, we do have expectations right in 
individual performance plans of the employees to be involved in the community so your 
performance is actually measured on whether you do or don’t kind of thing. (Executive 
G) 
As appointed representatives, the executive team has specialized experience and knowledge 
beyond that of the board.  This enables an opportunity to use their greater professional 
knowledge toward extracting personal gain, thereby leading to the possibility of moral hazard.  
For example, executives could put greater effort into outcomes that are more heavily 
compensated or could take actions that are simpler to administer but do not result in the best 
outcome for the members. 
CCU has mitigated the principal-agent dilemma in four ways.  First, members are also owners, 
so the actions of CU decision makers are experienced quickly by those with the power to ensure 
that problems are addressed.  Second, board members receive intense training in relevant areas.  
CCU has a competency-based program in which board members are assessed in their abilities 
and receive training in areas where they need to improve.  This knowledge strengthens their 
ability to understand and question the actions of their executive. Third, membership 
representatives and board members’ community embeddedness ensure that the member-owners 
are able to communicate their interests to the board members quickly through both formal and 
informal channels, thereby lessening the information asymmetry.  Fourth, as with other CUs, 
CCU makes use of implicit performance contracts for management (Fulton and Pohler, 2015). 
Board members expressed a similar accountability; however, theirs was to the communities and 
the elected delegates who in turn elect them.  For example, when a board member discussed the 
difficulty in balancing the needs of the city with those in smaller communities, she 
acknowledged the importance of listening to CCU’s membership delegates. 
What’s important to someone from (town) isn’t necessarily what’s important to someone 
from (city), if you know what I’m saying.  And so it’s so easy to forget about these people 
over here because they’re a small branch.  But they’re just as important as the people 
over here.  So because they have a representative at the table in our region, bringing us 
their concerns, their accolades, whatever they have to say to our little delegate meeting 
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in our region so that I as a director can take it forward to the board table, means a lot to 
them.  Otherwise how would they get that message through? …They come to the table, 
they bring their thoughts, their messages, and we listen.  We don’t just do this to make us 
feel good.  We do it because we know it’s what needs to be done because once we forget 
them; we’re going to lose at this end.  We don’t want to be a bank and that’s a risk when 
you’re growing quickly.  You have to be careful. (Board Member D) 
Despite the size of the CU, CCU board members are not centrally located.  Each member lives 
and works in their home communities which are scattered throughout their province.  Their lives 
are intertwined with those of their towns, cities and villages through local industry and 
community gatherings.  As such, not only do these board members experience the impacts of 
their CU’s actions, their local membership is in close contact, enabling immediate feedback.  The 
result was described by one executive: 
It’s individuals that are connected to community needs and willing to step forward to say 
that “our community needs” whatever the initiative is and recognizing it so I think it’s 
connected to our coop principles.  I think maybe we’re more connected there. (Executive 
G) 
As a result, a trusting relationship develops between the board member, CCU and their 
communities.  As a board member stated:  
In a smaller community like where I’m from, well the credit union has been there for 
fifty-some-odd years.  The community has grown up along with the credit union and, you 
know, it’s had, what’s the word I’m looking for - ties to the community and whatnot that I 
think most people there realize the co-operative nature of the credit union. (Board 
Member C) 
This personal connection to the community ensures that board members feel the impact of major 
decisions.  Although not overtly discussed during the interviews, there is a possibility that the 
community embeddedness of board members may also produce some risk associated with 
unfavourable decisions.  They may be compelled to consider the impact of their choices not only 
on their organization’s direction, but also on their communities, friends and personal reputations.  
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One board member described this difficulty when asked about how they would choose if and 
when to close a branch: 
It’s gonna make some interesting board meetings – I know that for sure.  Especially when 
it hits home or when it’s your own local credit union in your community.  Close to home 
it’s always harder. (Board Member A) 
Since CCU is quite large and encompasses several communities beyond those from which board 
members reside, CCU’s governance structure makes use of a large number of elected member 
representatives who reside in and act on behalf of each of CCU’s regions.  These delegates make 
up a substantial network that communicates information both from members to the board and 
vice versa.  Delegates are given significant responsibilities in steering the organization, and those 
who take on this role are embedded in their local communities, engaged in their local branch, and 
care about CCU’s impact on the welfare of their communities and the people within it. 
CCU Board members described the delegates as a connection between the board and the 
communities they serve: 
We wanted to make the role meaningful so there’s a reporting back from the directors on 
a quarterly basis, we try to have district council meetings.  But there’s also input to the 
director, you know, if there’s concerns at the district level to come back to the board.  
There’s an important part of the strategic planning cycle that involves the delegates 
where they’re brought down here at the beginning of November for a day and a half 
meeting and their input is sought on different topics.  They directly decide on district 
council community development funding so they’ve got an allocation based on 
membership and assets or maybe it’s assets – yeah, assets I think.  And each council can 
decide on what organizations or what have you, that they want to support.  But that’s a 
connection back to the local communities. (Board Member C) 
Through the delegates, the board members communicate with their communities and vice versa.  
Delegates enhance the feedback to CCU regarding their community situation and the impact of 
CCU’s decisions, thereby lessening the information asymmetry between the board and CCU’s 
members.  The interviewees all stressed the importance of the delegates to CCU.  As CCU 
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grows, the board needs a mechanism to communicate the membership.  This was discussed by 
two of the executives: 
In order to have a good relationship with your members you have to be talking to them 
on a regular basis.  And here at (CCU) we now have 100 delegates around the province 
that are bringing us the story from their home community.  Bringing us their concerns 
and taking back information about what (CCU) is doing.  If we didn’t have that we can’t 
rely on our frontline staff to do that communication.  It has to be done through the 
delegate structure which is co-operatives, credit unions. (Executive G)                         
One of the concerns is that, as you grow and if you pursue growth for all the good 
reasons that I’ve mentioned, is there a risk that you become too big and you somehow 
lose your connection to the grass roots that got you started in the first place?  It’s a real 
risk – I won’t deny that.  So our way of mitigating that risk is our governance structure. 
So we do have district councils that we try to engage into the whole governance process.  
Those delegates in turn elect directors on our board.  So we spend a substantial amount 
of effort on the whole governance engagement piece and that’s our way of making sure 
that we are still connected to the grass roots. (Executive I) 
CCU’s members elect the delegates to represent their communities.  Delegates elect the board of 
directors every three years.  Each member is elected regionally to ensure balanced representation 
from across the province and democratic provisions exist to enable the removal of unfit directors.   
A decision maker that is democratically held accountable to an aggregate of diverse wants and 
needs must pursue actions that satisfy the electorate or risk losing power.  The delegates tend to 
be representatives that are more engaged than an average member so they are aware of the 
decisions of the board and how those decisions impact the members from their community.  
As such, CCU board members would be conscious of the impact that their decisions would have 
on their reputations and chances for being reelected.  One executive discussed the challenge this 
creates when making decisions: 
We have to generate enough profit to be capitally strong, cause, guess what?  We have to 
be there and, and it's in shrinking margins, so there is less money to share back, to give 
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to communities. Right?  Or it's tougher.  It's, it is getting to be tougher and tougher 
because of shrinking margins, ‘cause the first natural place that you can look to cut or 
shave or eliminate or reduce is in giving back to communities.  Uh, it's going to be more 
difficult for us at CCU to do that, though, because of our governance structure.  Cause 
we're going to get a ton of push back from those (many) delegates going, Uh-uh, we have 
to find a, we have to find a balance. (Executive J) 
The close connection to the community that is made possible through the governance model 
results in greater accountability to the membership.  For example, when discussing the 
possibility of closing unprofitable branches, one board member discussed the difficulty that 
delegates would have in supporting the decision. 
Well everybody has personal opinions but at the same time most of those delegates are 
from small communities so they can certainly relate to what you’re talking about when 
you’re talking about closing a branch and there aren’t many delegates that are going to 
say, “yeah, you really need to be doing that.”  (laughs) ‘cause it could be their turn.  You 
know. (Board Member D) 
As a result, CCU board members and their executive team are placed in a situation where they 
are not able to completely mimic the actions that banks and the more bank-like CUs are taking.  
Instead, they are forced to explore other options. 
5.6 Innovation and Creativity 
As executives are held to the wishes of the board and the board are held to the wishes of CCU’s 
delegates, they are forced to understand and work through the complexity that opposing mindsets 
present.  This was particularly evident when the interviewees were asked about the possibility of 
closing branches.   
I think that there's ways that we can be 4 percent more efficient and not close a branch.  
Where you just go through all of your costs and really be honest about what's 
discretionary and what isn't, and it just takes a, probably more discipline than we have 
ever used.  But there are ways. (Executive E) 
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The interviewees stressed the different options that would be preferable to closing a branch and 
they showed pride in the creative ways that they have found the efficiencies elsewhere.  In fact, 
not one discussed the possibility of closing a branch without listing off other options that they 
would consider before finally settling on that option. 
Maybe some of these small branches maybe the best alternative is to close them – but you 
hate to see that.  It’s sort of the last thing you want to do.  So I think we’d try to find 
alternatives.  There may be a reduction in hours – may be three days a week.  I think we 
try to go as far as we can to serve the members and part of that may be through internet 
and mobile banking and whatnot.  But a lot of people like to deal face-to-face and what 
have you too. (Board Member C) 
When we're trying to be efficient, and at the same time, trying to be in our community, 
there's probably ways we can do that very cleverly.  And it might be that there's capacity 
in that location, and those two people aren't busy, but maybe we can route some of our 
call centre calls to them.  And they could be busy all day long with a very small footprint, 
and not a lot of cost, and that branch was paid for in 1972.  It's not costing a lot to keep 
the lights on there, but, maybe we could keep them employed in rural (province) in a 
different way.  So, it's not always about closing branches.  It's just about being creative. 
(Executive E) 
This is consistent with CCU’s history.   
We have left the lights on, and if we were going to go through tough times, and we have… 
to be very careful around capital, particularly when there were so many failures, and we 
were very careful about bottom line.  We were careful about things like conferencing and 
training and travel, and is there a different way we can do business so that people  keep 
their credentials and, can we do things a little differently, so that that's not the first place 
we look.  And we haven't looked there.  … So we don't want to be an organization that 
lays off people.  So how can we keep all these people and do something a little different 
without a cost and there's usually ways that we can do it.  Whether it's have long talks 
with our suppliers or where else we try to flex, you know, some organizational muscle to 
get our costs down.  So, we can always go to our suppliers, we can always go to the 
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things we are doing internally, we can always work just a little bit differently than we do, 
and that should be the last resort.  And I would say that so far in our history, that hasn't 
been a resort.  (Executive E) 
Given the difficult decisions and the need for these large and growing organizations to be able to 
find new, innovative solutions, how is a group of representatives from all over the province able 
to have the knowledge and ability to steer CCU?  Moreover, how do they have enough 
knowledge to question the advice and actions of an executive team that have years of specialized 
training and experience in their area? 
5.7 Accountability to Membership and Board Composition / Training 
Through the interviews, it became evident that accountability to members through their 
democratic structure was important to all CCU decision makers: executives and board. We asked 
some of them about the impact of the electorate system on the board composition and their 
competencies and questioned whether board appointments might be beneficial.  One executive’s 
answer summed up the trade-off: 
The downside of that though is that you can’t pick and choose, right?  ... well I can say to 
the nominating committee, “I’d like to see a business person on your council.” or a 
farmer or an accountant, or a lawyer, but you may not get that, right?  So my thought has 
always been you can train people.  They have to have the desire to be at the table and 
they’re not just warming a chair.  If that’s given then you can train them to be what you 
want them to be, so... I think that’s a real advantage for us.  (Executive F) 
In fact, as one board member put, CCU has found a way to ensure the organization has enough 
engaged individuals within the membership to fill the board positions.   
There’s always a problem getting good quality directors at any board table.  Well we 
have this pool of well educated, well trained people from all over the province and if they 
have any interest whatsoever in becoming a director.  What a great opportunity for 
(CCU).  These people are taking training on a regular basis alongside the directors.  
Like I’m a (member representative) first and foremost then I’m a director after that, sort 
of thing. (Board Member D)  
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CCU’s delegate training ensures that those holding the board accountable are knowledgeable 
enough to understand the CU’s situation and the choices available to its decision-makers. The 
training also prepares them for eventually taking a spot on the board and, with additional and 
ongoing board training, provides the knowledge necessary to be able to lead the organization. 
5.8 Summary  
Facing increasing challenges associated with regulatory and policy changes, and in an industry 
permeated by the financial logic, CCU has retained a balance that supports both community and 
financial logics.  This is accomplished through anchoring their culture in their co-operative 
identity and maintaining human resources practices that reinforce the community logic.   
Although this would influence their decision-makers when confronted with “difficult decisions”, 
CCU’s governance structure ultimately forces CCU decision makers to keep searching for an 
appropriate balance rather than mimicking the solutions that banks and more bank-like CUs have 
found to be successful. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
6.1 Discussion 
This study provides new insights in the areas of new institutional theory and CU governance.  
Through these insights, this study can assist regulators, governments and democratic 
organizations in reinforcing the governance of their organizations in ways that will assist them in 
navigating new pressures and challenges. 
6.1.1 Theoretical Contribution  
The study’s primary and novel theoretical contribution is to the understanding of the role of 
governance in the balancing of opposing logics.  CCU’s owner-member structure as well as the 
use of member representatives ensures that the community has the power to hold board members 
accountable for their decisions.  Since a CU’s members are also its users, they directly 
experience the impacts of the organizational decisions.  This provides an incentive for them to 
communicate their needs to decision makers.  The member representatives have an important 
role in this and receive specialized training to assist them.  They are elected by the membership 
and, therefore, must serve the members’ needs or risk not getting re-elected.  This responsibility 
encourages their engagement and the specialized training provides them the knowledge to 
question board decisions and to act as a conduit through which the board and members 
communicate.   
The member representative role facilitates direct and quick feedback on decisions and decreases 
the possibility of information asymmetry.  This reinforces accountability in two ways.  First, it 
ensures the board can be held accountable for their decisions.  The member representatives are 
able to communicate to members when the board is acting contrary to the community’s needs 
and wishes.  Second, it keeps the board informed about the actions of the CU.  Through this 
feedback channel, board members are able to gauge the performance of their executive team to 
lessen the ability for executive members to act in a way that is inconsistent with the board’s 
direction. 
As a result of their governance model, decision makers at CCU are exposed to the diverse needs 
and concerns brought forward by their members. Moreover, their membership representatives 
have the training and authority to hold them accountable to the membership for their decisions.  
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Finally, because they are embedded in their community, CCU board members regularly see how 
their decisions impact their local communities, families, and friends.  This prompts an obligation 
to engage in greater search efforts to find innovative solutions that will serve their members’ 
interests.  As such, a democratic governance structure helps the organization maintain a balance 
of logics that is reflective of its community. 
Since their community has interests and needs rooted in more than one logic, CCU decision 
makers search to find solutions that appease both logics.  In situations where logics naturally 
conflict, the increased complexity and lack of previously established responses trigger innovation 
as decision makers and their executives dig deeper.  This is consistent with other examples of 
innovation in response to dissonance from institutional pluralism (Jay 2013, Stark 2009). 
Through this study, we were able to observe decision makers struggle through the cognitive 
dissonance associated with a “difficult decision”.  CCU decision makers were noticeably 
impacted when discussing how they would decide the fate of a struggling branch in a shrinking 
community.  Because there has been no established procedure in responding to this situation, we 
were able to watch as they worked through the raw pressures of the financial and community 
logics.  Interviewees tended to respond to this in three ways.  Most would go through a list of 
several different options through which they could find a balance.  Some would refer to their 
organization’s history of not yet closing a branch.  Some would refer to the decision as a difficult 
decision that they would need to address in the future.  These responses were not mutually 
exclusive.  For example some interviewees would use all three responses. 
This study also supports current theoretical ideas about the management of opposing logics in 
hybrid organizations.  Consistent with Kodeih and Greenwood (2013), we found that the co-
operative principles inspire CCU decision makers to emulate a co-operative identity.  They pride 
themselves on being able to make decisions in line with what they perceive to be an ‘ideal’ co-
operative identity. Similar to the findings of Battilana and Dorado (2010), we have also 
demonstrated that the organization’s culture, as orchestrated through CCU’s human resources 
practices, has supported a balance of the financial and community logics.  Rather than through 
the creation of a common identity that combines both logics, however, this balance is facilitated 
through reinforcement of the more permeable and threatened community logic.  Since the 
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community IL is more susceptible to the influence of the financial logic, this reinforcement is 
likely necessary in protecting CCU from being dominated by the financial logic.  
Language choice, training and the focus on the co-operative identity ensure that CU staff 
understand and emulate the values passed down from the community and the board of directors.  
These practices support the day-to-day activities and help shape employee values so that they do 
not conflict with those of the CU.    
This study also offers a new way to approach an old co-operative dilemma. Through applying 
theory on ILs to gain a better understanding into how CU decision-makers balance the competing 
needs of the association with the needs of the membership, we are able to apply more recent 
theoretical developments to the well-established idea that co-operatives struggle with competing 
objectives (Briscoe, 1971). The study also contributes to understanding how to address some of 
the challenges still being faced by today’s co-operatives. Specifically, this study outlines the 
important role that organizational governance may play in addressing these well-documented 
tensions 
6.1.2 Empirical Contribution and Policy Implications 
CUs have historically played a vital role in the Canadian financial services industry.  Their 
values and structures result in a strong alternative to banks, as they are distinctly different in their 
design and purpose (McKillop and Wilson 2015). Moreover, they are more likely to support 
economic development in local communities (Fairbairn et al. 1997), and they have been found to 
be more resilient in times of global financial turmoil (Birchall and Hammond Ketilson 2009).  I 
initially proposed that the traditional benefits offered by these unique organizational forms may 
be threatened through their recent growth in response to regulatory and policy changes, and the 
changing dynamics of their communities.  These pressures have the potential to prompt CUs to 
think and act more like banks. 
However, the major empirical contribution of this study is that it highlights the importance of the 
role played by a CU’s governance model. It is critical that CUs ensure their governance 
structures and models are established and reinforced in ways that will ensure their democratic 
nature and accountability to their members and local communities is maintained.  The 
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accountability of CU board members to their membership ensures that they are able to maintain a 
balance of logics that is in line with the needs of the members and their communities.   
The CU examined in this study has reinforced its democratic process through community 
embeddedness, member representatives, and training/education.  Board and member 
representatives live among the members they represent.  This ensures greater accountability to 
their communities and better feedback on the impact of board and executive decisions.  The role 
of the member representatives further enhances the feedback and promotes increased 
engagement.  Finally, education of CCU’s board and member representatives ensures they are 
able to understand and question the actions of other parties.  This reinforces their knowledge and 
authority, and mitigates the principal-agent problem. 
Based on the findings of this study, I recommend that policy-makers exercise caution when 
considering changes that will impact the democratic nature of co-operative organizations.  Any 
actions that would impede the ability of members to hold their board accountable for the 
organization’s actions could harm not only the organization’s competitive advantage, but also its 
unique advantages and ability to serve as an alternative financial services provider.  CUs have 
been able to thrive in an industry that is permeated by the financial logic and dominated by 
organizations that have mastered strategies rooted in that logic.  CCU’s governance triggers a 
struggle to achieve a balance both within individuals, but also between individuals, that supports 
both logics.  The innovation that they achieve as an outcome of that process has helped them 
excel in their co-operative form, which allows them to provide benefits for their members and 
members’ communities. 
Some CUs and CU regulators are considering undertaking governance and regulatory changes 
that could fundamentally alter the democratic process of co-operative board elections. Placing 
restrictive criteria on board nomination bylaws can greatly limit the ability for an average 
member to be elected to the board of directors (Silcoff and Strauss 2015). Depending on the 
policy design, the appointment of board members outside the electoral process could lessen the 
accountability of board members to the membership. Although they might have the education 
needed to mitigate the principal-agent problem, appointed board members could be less 
accountable to the membership, reducing the perception of the board’s legitimacy.  When 
encountering “difficult decisions” appointed board members may not feel the same pressures to 
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find an appropriate balance.  Ultimately, this could weaken the organization’s ability to innovate 
and erode its uniqueness 
While changes to capitalization requirements and tax policy for CUs were mentioned as creating 
pressures for growth by the CU decision-makers interviewed in this study, a more detailed 
examination of the impact of these policies on the governance and operations of CUs was 
beyond the scope of the current study. However, by exploring the way that CU decision makers 
perceive and respond to the increasing pressures of recent and ongoing changes in industry, this 
study also provides some insights about how other regulatory and industry changes may impact 
these unique organizations. In the interviews, CCU’s decision makers discussed the additional 
pressures of the changing industry and regulations.  Although this increased complexity and 
presented new challenges for CCU, there was no indication that these challenges were prompting 
CCU to become more bank-like.   
In situations where they may be tempted to adopt strategies more consistent with a financial 
logic, CCU’s decision makers instead chose to take a unique approach.  For example, the 
increased industry competition could have prompted CCU to solicit new members from other 
CUs.  Instead, CCU decision makers have responded, along with other Canadian CUs, through 
the creation of joint committees with other CUs.  Through these partnerships, CUs are able to 
benefit from collective resources and innovation to help them compete better with banks.  This 
unique response is consistent with the co-operative principles and made them more competitive. 
Notwithstanding these benefits, there could be potential downsides to members if these co-
operative activities between CUs serve to reduce healthy competition in the industry. However, 
this is likely not a major issue in an industry that is as concentrated as the Canadian financial 
services industry. Moreover, in reality the presence of CUs likely enhances competition for 
financial services and makes the industry fairer for consumers (Schneiberg, 2013).   
This study suggests that a CU’s governance structure may lead them to respond to industry and 
policy challenges with innovative solutions; however, there is still a concern about what the 
impact of these challenges mean for the long-term viability of CUs.  Interviewees expressed 
concern about their ability to continue to respond to these new challenges in an increasingly 
competitive environment. As one board member stated: 
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If credit unions end up getting taxed (provincially) as are banks, we are going to have 
less dollars and we are very active in terms of supporting various organizations or 
structures within our communities. And with less dollars we aren’t going to be able to do 
that work that we see as being very important and being a very important part of what we 
are. (Board Member H) 
There are also legitimate questions that could be raised about the efficiency of more complex 
governance structures relatively to the benefits that have been outlined here. Moreover, 
challenges associated with the scalability of these structures as the co-operative grows must be 
addressed for CUs to retain these advantages. 
In summary, policy-makers should be cautious of regulatory changes that seek to “level the 
playing field” between co-operatives and investor-owned firms. Regulators must recognize that 
the unique advantages credit unions provide to society come directly from their unique 
ownership and governance structures. This study provides insights that can assist governments 
and regulators in ensuring that these important organizations are able to remain a distinct 
alternative for the Canadian public to access financial services.   
6.2 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
This study had a few limitations. The first was its small sample size; we only interviewed 
thirteen decision-makers in one CU. The group included the entire executive team and five board 
members, so was likely not completely representative of the Board.  Although there was an effort 
to include individuals with various tenures and backgrounds, the ethnicity and ages of the 
interviewees was not considered, resulting in a sample that may not fully represent the diversity 
of CCU’s board. However, I am confident that I reached theoretical saturation, because toward 
the end of all the interviews, we were not hearing any new information from any of the 
participants.   
The importance of governance had not been anticipated at the onset of the study and only came 
to light through the interviews. Once I understood the importance of governance in this study, I 
attempted to find applicable research to help me establish a context for my research.  A lack of 
research in this area at the time made this difficult.  Over the span of this study the field 
progressed and new information emerged to assist me; however, the limitations of a Masters 
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project prevented me from going back to initial interviewees with questions based on what I 
learned from this research.  Grounded theory requires a strong knowledge base in the areas being 
explored.  Because I had not researched governance prior to the interview stage, I missed the 
opportunity to provide follow-up questions that might have better informed my results.   
If I was to undertake similar research in the future, I could address this limitation through 
investigating possible outcomes more broadly so as to be better prepared or to hold interviews in 
two stages.  In the first stage I would get a base understanding of the outcome.  This could be 
followed by research into relevant areas and a second round of interviews based on that research. 
Finally, this is case study of only one organization, and so its conclusions are limited in 
generalizability. While the study can provide preliminary insights into all co-operative 
organizations, additional research would be needed to support and confirm these insights.  
Moreover, CCU decision makers see their governance structure as more democratic than many 
other Canadian CUs and see their policies as more community-focused.  It would be interesting 
to do a comparative analysis of CCU and another large CU in order to understand the impact of 
the varying degrees of democratic representation on their decision making processes.  The 
importance of governance could also be tested through an examination of an equally democratic 
hybrid that extends less effort in reinforcing its culture, a community-focused investor-owned 
bank, or a bank that is neither a CU, nor a corporation, yet is highly community-focused, such as 
First Nations Bank of Canada. 
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APPENDIX A:  Interview Questions  
 What are the changes that have been occurring in the financial services industry over time?  
 How has your credit union adapted to these changes?  
 What has stayed the same throughout? 
 What qualities do you look for or attempt to avoid in other credit unions when considering a 
merger?  
 What does your credit union plan to gain through its most recent mergers?  
 How important is your credit union’s growth to you?   
 What concerns do you have/benefits do you see arising from your credit union’s growth? 
 Have you experienced any conflicts arising from the increase in this growth? 
 How do you visualize the problems facing your credit union as it tries to be both more 
efficient and more responsive to community and sustainable development objectives? 
 How do you see your credit union as different and/or similar to the major investor-owned 
banks?  
 Do you see any differences between CCU and other credit unions? 
 How do you define your credit union’s community? 
 As CCU grows, do you see its relationship changing with other large credit unions? 
Added Interview Questions 
 As some towns are shrinking the credit union often remains the only physical financial 
institution left.  Over time these smaller branches can become less financially viable as their 
membership dwindles, ultimately requiring members from other branches to subsidize their 
losses.  What is the best way to respond to those pressures? 
 How would you explain your response to the members of the smaller branch/larger fiscally 
strong branch? 
 Could you tell us a little bit about your background – both education and work history?  
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APPENDIX B:  7 Cooperative Principles 
Cooperatives around the world generally operate according to the same core principles and 
values, adopted by the International Co-operative Alliance in 1995. Cooperatives trace the roots 
of these principles to the first modern cooperative founded in Rochdale, England in 1844. 
1. Voluntary and Open Membership 
Cooperatives are voluntary organizations, open to all people able to use its services and willing 
to accept the responsibilities of membership, without gender, social, racial, political or religious 
discrimination. 
2. Democratic Member Control 
Cooperatives are democratic organizations controlled by their members—those who buy the 
goods or use the services of the cooperative—who actively participate in setting policies and 
making decisions. 
3. Members' Economic Participation 
Members contribute equally to, and democratically control, the capital of the cooperative. This 
benefits members in proportion to the business they conduct with the cooperative rather than on 
the capital invested. 
4. Autonomy and Independence 
Cooperatives are autonomous, self-help organizations controlled by their members. If the co-op 
enters into agreements with other organizations or raises capital from external sources, it is done 
so based on terms that ensure democratic control by the members and maintains the 
cooperative’s autonomy. 
5. Education, Training and Information 
Cooperatives provide education and training for members, elected representatives, managers and 
employees so they can contribute effectively to the development of their cooperative. Members 
also inform the general public about the nature and benefits of cooperatives. 
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6. Cooperation among Cooperatives 
Cooperatives serve their members most effectively and strengthen the cooperative movement by 
working together through local, national, regional and international structures. 
7. Concern for Community 
While focusing on member needs, cooperatives work for the sustainable development of 
communities through policies and programs accepted by the members. 
Retrieved from http://usa2012.coop/about-co-ops/7-cooperative-principles on March 3, 2014. 
